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I. INTRODUCTION
On February 26, 1999, the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC" or "Commission") issued a Declaratory Ruling that "ISP-bound
taffic is jurisdictionally mixed and appears to be largely interstate."' The
* The Author is a principal in Public Policy Consulting, a Brooklyn, New York-based
firm that specializes in telecommunications policy. He wants to express appreciation to
those who read an earlier version and provided extremely helpful comments: Curtis
Hopfinger, SBC; Edwin Parker, telecommunications consultant; and Bob Rowe, Montana
Public Service Commission. This Article and its underlying analysis reflect only the views
of the Author.
1. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 F.C.C.R. 3689, 15
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 201 (1999) [hereinafter Declaratory Ruling], vacated by Bell Ad. Tel.
Cos. v. FCC, 206 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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ruling did not invalidate existing interconnection agreements or preempt
the state commissions that had "imposed reciprocal compensation
obligations for this traffic.",2 Indeed, according to the Declaratory Ruling,
"parties should be bound by their existing interconnection agreements, as
interpreted by state commissions." 3 On March 24, 2000, the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals vacated the Declaratory Ruling and remanded the issue to
the FCC.4 Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit added that incumbents, in the
interim, were "free to seek relief from state-authorized compensation that
they believe[d] to be wrongfully imposed."5
In the rich history of communications policy, this particular issue has
proven one of the most curious. On the surface, the dispute appears to
hinge on jurisdiction and money. The competitive local exchange carriers
("CLECs") maintain that calls initiated on an incumbent's network and
transferred through the CLEC's network to an Internet service provider
("ISP") are local calls subject to termination fees under negotiated
interconnection agreements. The incumbent local exchange carriers
("ILECs"), however, maintain that ISP-bound traffic is not local because
those calls do not terminate at the ISP, but instead access the Internet, a
• • 6
global medium of communication.
Two elements of this dispute have defined communications policy for
decades: the jurisdictional tension between federal and state regulators, and
the self-interested claims and counterclaims of rival telecommunications
providers. This Article focuses primarily on the jurisdictional question:
Should the FCC declare ISP-bound traffic interstate, and, thus, place it
under its jurisdiction' Alternatively, should state commissions on their
2. Id. para. 1.
3. Id.
This conclusion, however, does not in itself determine whether reciprocal
compensation is due in any particular instance. As explained below, parties may
have agreed to reciprocal compensation for ISP-traffic, or a state commission, in
the exercise of its authority to arbitrate interconnection disputes under section 252
of the Act, may have imposed reciprocal compensation obligations for this traffic.
In the absence of a federal rule regarding the appropriate inter-carrier
compensation for this traffic, we therefore conclude that parties should be bound
by their existing interconnection agreements, as interpreted by state commissions.
Id.
4. Bell At. Tel. Cos., 206 F.3d 1. The court was not satisfied that the FCC had
sufficiently explained its interpretation on a key point: "LECs that terminate calls to ISPs
are not properly seen as 'terminat[ing] ... local telecommunications traffic,' and [] such
traffic is 'exchange access' rather than 'telephone exchange service."' Id. at 9.
5. Id.
6. The Internet is "an international network of interconnected computers that enables
millions of people to communicate with one another in 'cyberspace' and to access vast
amounts of information from around the world." Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 844 (1997).
7. The FCC has sought comments on a number of issues relating to the remand of its
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own initiative intervene to resolve this dispute between the ILECs and
CLECs? The substance of this semantic conflict also takes on importance
in the debate: What is a local call, and why does this matter to public
regulators?
Answering these esoteric questions requires some understanding of
the rapid changes in information technologies in recent years. Indeed,
lurking below the surface of this dispute is an explosion of emerging
technologies that threatens to transform the function and scope of the
publicly switched telephone network ("PSTN").8
Part II of this Article explains how the once invincible PSTN has
evolved into a diverse, dynamic "network of networks." 9 Part I presents a
reciprocal compensation ruling. See Comment Sought on Remand of the Commission's
Reciprocal Compensation Declaratory Ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit, Public Notice, 15 F.C.C.R. 11,311 (1999).
8. The hottest new technology in the first half of 2000 used wireless application
protocol ("WAP"), which enables users to obtain information from selective Web sites.
Nicole Harris, AT&T Wireless Unit to Offer Free Web Access, WALL ST. J., May 18, 2000,
at B14; Andrew Ross Sorkin, When Referring to Wireless in Europe, Use the Future Tense,
N.Y. TimEm, June 7, 2000, at H8. Craig McCaw's Teledesic envisions a network of 288
communications satellites to provide "a full array of high-speed video, data, and voice
services to the vast portions of the planet beyond the reach of today's ground-based wired
and wireless networks." Bamaby J. Feder, Can Craig McCaw Keep His Satellites From
Crashing?, N.Y. TIMEs, June 4,2000, at 3-1. In addition to auctioning radio spectrum to the
private sector and liberalizing the uses of licensed spectrum, the FCC is studying other
options to allow for more efficient use of the spectrum, including "secondary markets;
software-defined radios; and a new concept, loosely called 'bandwidth managers,' that will
let the private sector decide how to allot spectrum to multiple uses." Michael R. Zimmerman
& John Rendleman, FCC Offers Bold Plan for Spectrum, EWEEK (May 29, 2000), at
http://www.zdnet. com/eweek/stories/general/0,11011,2578135,00.html?chkpt=zdnnplms.
Will there be a bandwidth glut? According to Nortel, no. The number of users,
their time on the Net, and bandwidth consumed by their applications are all going
up. Internet bandwidth is getting cheap fast and price elasticity is driving demand
up. Internet traffic, according to Worldcom (sic), is growing at 1,000 percent per
year... Internet telephony is accelerating thanks to VOIP (voice over IP). Voice
portals that access Internet information over the telephone are all the rage.
Bob Metcalfe, The Next Big Thing in the World of Convergence: the Broadcast Internet,
INFOWORLD.COM (June 2, 2000), at http://www.infoworld.comlarticles/op/xmlO0/06/05/
000605opmetcalfe.xml.
Mr. Gates said that while the majority of businesses are now connected to
highspeed broadband Internet service, which is necessary for many of the new
technologies, the wider use of new services and devices will depend on how
quickly homes are wired. He said he anticipates that within five years from 25%
to 30% of all U.S. homes will be connected to broadband services of some sort.
Wireless devices will also proliferate for business and personal use, he said.
Paula L. Stepankowsky, Gates Predicts Internet is Ready for its Next Stage, WALL ST. J.,
May 25, 2000, at B14. Some of these developments will expand and supplement the PSTN,
while others will not.
9. "[The central institutions of future telecommunications will not be carriers but
systems integrators that mix and match transmission segments, services, and equipment,
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broad history of the dual federalism of the FCC and the state commissions.
Part IV presents an interpretation of why this issue is far more important to
communications policy than merely a bitter dispute over a few billion
dollars in claims of reciprocal compensation.'0 Data traffic outweighs voice
and is growing at a much faster rate." This dispute-the nature of calls to
ISPs-foreshadows many technological developments that could threaten
to marginalize the publicly switched network.' 2 The failure to ascertain the
actual costs of transmitting data through the publicly switched network, and
to impose those costs on appropriate providers, could undermine the
integrity of the publicly switched network as traffic leaps into the digital
future of data packet transmission via Internet Protocol ("IP"). 3 While all
using various carriers.... The new issues will be those of integrating the emerging 'network
of networks."' Eli M. Noam, Beyond Telecommunications Liberalization: Past
Performance, Present Hype, and Future Direction, in THE NEW INFORMATION
INFRASTRuCTURE 31 (William J. Drake ed., 1995).
10. "Merrill Lynch analyst Dan Reingold estimates that reciprocal compensation
payments to CLECs will be $600 million this year, $1 billion next year, and $2 billion in
2000." Fed. Filings Bus. News, FCC Decision Could Open Internet to Fed'l Regs, Dow
Jones & Co., Inc., Oct. 30, 1998 [hereinafter FCC Decision Could Open Internet to Fed'l
Regs].
11. "[In 1995, PCs outsold TVs, the number of e-mail messages surpassed snail mail,
and RBOC data traffic (driven by an unbelievable increase in Internet usage) exceeded
voice traffic for the first time," noted George Gilder. Anthony B. Perkins, Bandwidth or
Bust, WIRED, March 1996, at 80. See Dennis Jennings, Next Generation Networks (1998)
(unpublished paper, on file with the Federal Communications Law Journal) (projecting
voice growing at 8% in five to ten years, while data will grow 45% annually during this
period).
12. According to the Yankee Group, 1.1 million households had cable modems to
provide access to the Internet, while 320,000 homes were connected via digital subscriber
lines ("DSL"). In the first quarter of 2000, "SBC Communications installed 201,000 DSL
connections; US WEST installed 136,000 DSL connections; GTE installed 88,000 DSL
connections; Covad installed 100,000 DSL connections; [and] Bell Atlantic installed 60,000
DSL connections, doubling its figures from the end of 1999." DSL Gaining Ground on
Cable Modems, GOVERNMENT TECHNOLOGY, at http://www.govtech.netlnews.phtml?
docid=2000.05.04-1030000000000094 (May 4,2000).
13. Internet telephony, or "Internet phone" technology, allows you to use your
personal computer and your Net connection both to make and receive phone
calls.... Instead of dialing a long distance telephone call, which slogs through a
local network, a long-distance network, then finally to another local network at the
recipient's end, you use the Internet. That means you are only billed for the local
call to your ISP .... When you use a regular phone line, the entire connection is
devoted to your voice. When you use an Internet telephony connection, your voice
is digitally encoded, then broken up into packets and sent out across the Net.
Charles Pappas, How Does Internet Telephony Work? YAHOO! INTERNET LnE, at
http:lwww.zdnet.comlzdhelp/stories/mainlO,5594,903525,00.html (last visited Jan. 17,
2001).
The new telecommunications environment is in stark contrast to the old one.
Instead of building services around monolithic switches, largely from Lucent and
Nortel, that tie the carrier to a single supplier for both hardware and applications,
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eyes are focused on the bright, shiny Pretty Amazing New Stuff
("PANS"), 14 federal and state regulators must not neglect the tarnished,
copper plain old telephone services ("POTS"). 5 Indeed, both require a
publicly switched network capable of accommodating emerging
technologies such as data packet transmission without being subsumed by
them.16 Part V argues that ISP-bound traffic is interstate in nature, and that
state commissions should initiate a generic rulemaking process to resolve
this dispute, facilitating the next round of interconnection agreements. If
the state commissions do not resolve these conflicts on ISP-bound traffic,
one would expect the FCC to reissue its Order defining appropriate
obligations under reciprocal compensation.
Based on this case study, Part VI concludes that the regulatory
philosophy employed during the regime of monopoly providers (bargaining
among competing interests or balancing conflicting social objectives) must
be replaced by a new paradigm that seeks to establish a level,
service providers can now pick and choose hardware and software from a variety
of suppliers .... The new infrastructure can be roughly divided into three layers.
The first includes switching hardware designed to straddle the old world of circuit
switches and the new world of packet-based networks. A second layer, which is
inhabited by software-based devices known as softswitches, provides call control
features that tap into the intelligent networks of the voice world. A third layer,
known as the service creation layer, provides an environment for the creation of
applications and services, such as call forwarding and unified messaging.
Joe McGarvey, Voice Carriers Enter New Era, INTER@CTIW WK. (Apr. 3, 2000), available
at http://www.zdnet.coml/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2504265,00.htlm?chkpt.
14. HARRY NEwT'rON, NEwToN'S TELECOM DICnoNARY 60 (16th ed. 2000) (defining
"PANS" as "a term coined to describe ISDN capabilities which should eventually replace
[plain old telephone services]").
15. "Pundits still seem to believe that the copper cage protects local telephone
companies from outside competition. But in fact, the cage incarcerates them in copper wires,
while the world prepares to pass them by." George Gilder, From Wires to Waves, FORBES
ASAP, June 5, 1995, at 125, 141.
16. Perhaps, in the long run, voice will be packetized as data, virtually every home in
America will be connected via fiber to the curb, and these immediate policy disputes will be
long forgotten. But, as Lord Keynes warned us, "In the long run, we are all dead." For the
present, however, see NARUC INTERNEr WORKING GROUP, POLICIES ON PRICING AND
UNIVERSAL SERVICE FOR INTERNET TRAFFIC ON THE PUBLIC SWITCHED NETWORK 37 (Apr.
1998), available at http://www.nrri.ohio-state.edu/download/9811.pdf (last visited Jan. 17,
2001) [hereinafter POLICIES ON PRICING AND UNIVERSAL SERVICE].
To make the transition to the data-friendly network will involve capital outlays. It
is not enough that the Internet be able to process data. The loops and switches of
the PSN must also be capable of doing so. Given that there is little compensation
today for the increased traffic already traversing the network, due at least in part
to the ISP access charge exemption, carriers may not be willing to make the
investments needed to upgrade the network without a reasonable expectation of
capital recovery.
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technologically neutral playing field through regulatory parity. 17 The twin
forces of competition and technological advance create a powerful synergy
that regulators must embrace by ensuring that regulated entities bear equal
burdens or receive adequate compensation." Especially in this competitive
context, intercarrier compensation must be sufficient to enable providers to
cover their costs and maintain adequate investment in their proprietary
networks. The failure of public policy to achieve this intermediate objective
jeopardizes the future quality and integrity of the network of networks.
II. THE PUBLICLY SWITCHED TELEPHONE NETWORK ("PSTN")
EVOLVES INTO A "NETWORK OF NETWORKS"
Before the AT&T divestiture in 1984, telephony was provided
through the PSTN owned and maintained by monopoly providers, which
were regulated by the FCC and the state commissions.' 9 Other providers,
17. Thomas W. Bonnett, The New State Role in Ensuring Universal
Telecommunications Services, in MAKING UNIVERSAL SERVICE POLICY: ENHANCING THE
PROCESS THROUGH MULTIDISCIPLINARY EVALUATION 215 (Barbara A. Cherry et al. eds.,
1999).
The federal Telecommunications Act, which President Clinton signed into law on
February 8, 1996, shattered the social compact that had governed the provision of
basic telephone services in this country for most of this century .... The explicit
terms of the modem social compact in the telephone industry included: the
granting of an exclusive monopoly franchise to the local exchange company; the
public regulation of both the prices and quality of services to protect consumers;
and a rate-setting process that granted reasonable profits to the company's
shareholders to ensure that adequate infrastructure investment was maintained.
The highly evolved social compact also included the responsibility of the
monopoly provider to provide various public service obligations. As defined by
Noam, the universal service obligation requires a carrier to reach every willing
user and desired destination wherever located whereas common carriage is the
obligation to provide services without discrimination to all users, given a physical
plant. A related concept is carrier of last resort (COLR), which is the requirement
to provide services to all customers within a service area. Hence, granting an
exclusive monopoly franchise to the local exchange company along with public
regulation of its prices, profits, and infrastructure investments constituted a social
compact that was generally accepted by the public for most of this century.
Id. (citations omitted).
18. Sprint Comms. Co., L.P., Col. Pub. Utils. Comm., Decision No. COO-479, Docket
No. 00B-01 IT, 2000 WL 689363, at *2 n.6 (May 5, 2000).
As we move forward, correctly, to the consideration of globally connected
communications networks, we need to abandon the archaic approaches to service
categorization and regulatory jurisdiction. Regardless of technology or purpose,
universal access to equitable connections should be the goal. Whether a call is
local, interstate, voice, data, wireless, internet or wireline should not be a
determining factor in how the activity is regulated, priced or compensated.
Id.
19. "In the early 1980s, AT&T provided about three-quarters of the nation's local
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such as MCI, handled a small percentage of long-distance calls, but even
those calls were initiated and/or terminated through the facilities of the
local exchange carriers. In this regime of publicly regulated monopoly
providers, the PSTN reigned supreme.
Later in the 1980s, more competition emerged in the long-distance
market, and competitive access providers ("CAPs") began to develop local
transmission systems to bypass the local exchange carriers.20 Also in this
decade, telephony sprouted wings, as the FCC awarded cellular licenses in
the top markets to provide mobile, wireless communications.2 ' The PSTN
still dominated the telephony market, but the leakage to rival networks had
begun.
In 1989, two events changed the world. The Berlin Wall fell, and the
New York Public Service Commission ("NY PSC") allowed competition in
the local exchange services. The NY PSC ruling shocked the
telecommunications industry. Although competition in the long-distance
market had matured since the 1984 AT&T divestiture, few thought the
local telephone monopoly would be broken. For most of this century,
conventional wisdom held that local exchanges were natural monopolies.22
Competition in the local exchange market, once viewed as a radical
departure from the regime of regulating monopoly providers, swept across
the nation as a grass fire might flash across the prairie after a summer
drought. By January 1996, "[a]t least 29 states, including New York, [had]
telephone service and almost all interstate long distance service." FCC, TRENDS IN
TELEPHONE SERVICE 1-3 (December 2000), available at http:f/www.fcc.govlBureausl
Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-StateLink/IAD/trend200.pdf [hereinafter TRENDS].
20. Competitive access providers developed the capacity for large users of long-
distance services to make and receive calls, bypassing the local exchange system. This
enabled the users to avoid paying the access fees charged to the long-distance carriers by the
local exchange company. Id During this period, these access fees-the charge to the long-
distance providers for the use of the local exchange networks-were estimated at thirty to
forty percent of the cost of the long-distance call. Id.
21. When AT&T explained the technology of cellular phones to the FCC in the 1970s,
the company did not expect it would become popular, estimating only one million
subscribers by the turn of the century. According to TRENDS IN TELEPHONE SERVICE, "there
were 92,000 subscribers in 1984, as compared with over 97 million subscribers as of June
2000." Id at 12-1.
22. The NY PSC had to assess many conflicting factors. Could new firms provide
services at better prices than New York Telephone? If so, would competition be limited to
premium services for businesses, which would erode the revenue base of the incumbent
telephone company and cause higher rates for remaining customers? Could the
interconnection rules be written fairly to both the incumbent and prospective entrants? How
should physical collocation rules be established to achieve integration between two or more
networks? See THOMAS W. BONNET, TELEWARS IN THE STATES: TELEcOMMUNICATIONS
ISSUES IN A N-W ERA OF COMPErriON 70 (1996) [hereinafter TELEWARS].
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approved measures to end telephone monopolies. 2 ' Drawing heavily upon
the work of state commissions, especially in the area of developing
interconnection agreements between rival networks,24 Congress enacted
and President Clinton signed into law the Telecommunications Act of 1996
("1996 Act"). 25 It promoted competition in telephone and cable television
services, and partially deregulated much of the telecommunications
26industry.
The 1996 Act envisioned that competition in local telephone services
would take three forms: building facility-based networks, contracting for
the use of unbundled network elements ("UNEs") from the ILECs, and
providing resale.27 Building facility-based networks is the most expensive
way to compete against the incumbent providers. Examples of this
approach include wireless technologies such as cellular and personal
communications services ("PCS"); cable television systems upgraded to
include switches to provide two-way voice transmission; and the alternative
networks built by the CLECs, mostly in urban areas, to serve businesses
21
and larger users.
The second approach comes from the use of the incumbent's network
in combination with the prospective competitors' facilities. This requires an
interconnection agreement that specifies the terms of the use of the
incumbent's network elements, or the price for transport over the
incumbent's network. If a cable television system wanted to provide
telephony, it would have to make a major investment in switches and then
negotiate with the incumbent provider to use some of the latter's facilities
in combination with its own network. Similarly, a CLEC might wish to
contract for the use of some of the incumbent's network elements instead
of building a parallel network infrastructure.
The third method-resale-occurs when a prospective competitor
buys network capacity from the ILEC at wholesale rates and then retails
these services directly to consumers. The best example of resale comes
from the long-distance industry. More than a decade ago, AT&T sold large
blocks of long-distance services to large users. At that time, the FCC forced
the company to sell that wholesale capacity at the same rate to
23. Jonathan Rabinovitz, Competition to Begin for Local Phone Calls, Ending a
Monopoly, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1996, at 24.
24. See TELEWARS, supra note 22, at 57-74.
25. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
26. TELEWARS, supra note 22, at ch. 4-5.
27. See FCC, Local Competition Homepage, at http://www.fcc.gov/ccb/local_
competition/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2001).
28. THOMAS W. BONNETr, THE TWENTY-ONE MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
ABOUT STATE TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 15 (1997).
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entrepreneurial companies, which resold those long-distance services
directly to the consumers at rates competitive with AT&T's tariffed rates.
Until recently, "only the four [or five] largest long-distance companies
maintained their own networks, [while] hundreds of smaller companies
[bought] capacity from them at wholesale rates and then [resold] services to
the public.
29
Some consumer advocates have been disappointed that competition in
telephone and cable television markets has not advanced more rapidly since
the passage of the 1996 Act.30 Expectations of subsequent competition in
liberalized markets based on the rhetorical hyperbole surrounding the 1996
Act would have been impossible to meet.
31
Competition in local telephone markets has begun in all but 18 of the
nation's 193 local access and transport areas ("LATAs").32 CLECs have
entered the "largest and densest markets first."33 Revenues "come primarily
from special access and local private line services rather than from
switched service to end users. 34 CLECs continued to gain market share
from local services in the first half of 2000. According to FCC data,
"CLECs reported 12.7 million (or 6.7%) of the approximately 192 million
nationwide local telephone lines that were in service to end-users on June
30, 2000."3" This growth comes from the expansion of the CLEC networks
29. Id.
30. MARK COOPER & GENE KIMMELMAN, THE DIGITAL DIVIDE CONFRONTS THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996: ECONOMIC REALrrY VERSUS PUBLIC POLICY vi (1999).
The Telecom Act's fundamental premise that breaking down legal barriers to
market entry would unleash a barrage of facilities-based competition in which
cable companies used their infrastructure to attack the local phone market, and
local phone companies used their networks to attack cable, has proven wrong.
Incumbent local telephone and cable monopolists have simply refused to compete
with one another. Instead they have merged into larger and larger regional firms
that now form tight national oligopolies.
Id.
31. Edmund L. Andrews, Clinton Set to Sign Bill That Is Expected to Spur Competition,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1996, at Al:
Today, we have broken up two of the biggest government monopolies left: the
monopolies in local telephone service and in cable television.... For the first time
ever, Americans will be given choices. Besides lower rates and better service, the
result will be innovative new products and services that will create thousands of
new American jobs.
Id. (quoting Rep. Thomas J. Bliley, the bill's primary author).
32. FCC, LOCAL COMPETION: AUGUST 1999, available at http://www.fcc.govl
Bureaus/CommonCarrier/Reports/FCC-StateLink/IAD/lcomp99-l.pdf (last visited Jan.
22,2001).
33. IM at 6.
34. Id. at 1.
35. FCC, LocAL TELEPHONE COMPETITION: STATUS AS OF JUNE 30,2000 1 (Dec. 2000),
available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link
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(CLECs' own local loop facilities now provide one-third of their end-user
lines), and the increased resale of services and leasing UNEs loops from the
ILECs. For example, the CLECs bought 5.7 million lines from the ILECs
in mid-2000, which they resold to customers, compared to about 4.6
million at the end of 1999. Similarly, CLECs leased more than three
million UNE loops from the ILECs in mid-June-double the number
leased at the end of 1999.16 Even though the ILECs remain the dominant
providers of local telephone services, the recent growth of market share by
the CLECs constitutes a strong beginning for competition in many local
telephone markets.37 After Bell Atlantic was allowed to provide long-
distance services in New York, it reported gaining 428,000 customers in
the first quarter of 2000. This development triggered renewed interest by
AT&T and other providers to compete for customers in these local
telephone markets." One might expect a similar response in Texas now that
SBC has been granted permission to provide long-distance telephone
services in that state.39 Furthermore, electric utilities, which control about
one-third of the nation's 150,000 miles of fiber-optic cable,40 have begun to
pursue new ventures in the rapidly growing telecommunications market.4'
While 65% of American households subscribe to cable television,
10% now receive television services from direct broadcast satellite
("DBS") (up from less than 2% in 1975). DBS is growing at an annual rate
of 40%.42 The price of cable television services has increased since 1996,
while the cost of these alternative technologies has steadily declined since
/IAD/lcoml200.pdf (last visited Jan. 22,2001) [hereinafter LocAL TELEPHONE
COMPETION]. 'This represents a 53% growth in CLEC market size during the first six
months of this year." Id.
36. Id. at 1-2.
37. Id. at 2. "At least one CLEC reported providing service in the District of Columbia,
in Puerto Rico, and in all states except Idaho. Four or more CLECs reported serving
customers in 29 states and the District of Columbia." Id.
38. Leslie Cauley, AT&T Faces Challenge Over Cable-Phone Goal, WALL ST. J., Apr.
28, 2000, at A3. Cauley reports that "AT&T is reselling Bell Atlantic's services under its
own name, and has signed up more than 300,000 such customers.... But AT&T eventually
hopes to flip these customers to its own cable networks or those of partners, because leasing
Bell lines is very expensive." Id. Cauley also reports that AT&T had 40,000 customers for
local telephone services during the first quarter of 2000 using its cable television
infrastructure, and was gaining "new cable-telephony customers at a rate of about 15,000 a
month." Id.
39. Mark Wigfield & Deborah Solomon, SBC Cleared to Offer Texas Long Distance,
WALL ST. J., July 3, 2000, at B6.
40. Joe Nickell, When the Power Falls, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, June 12, 2000, at
124.
41. Peter S. Goodman, Linking Old Economy to New, WASH. POST, June 6, 2000, at El.
42. Thomas W. Hazlett, TV Smackdown! (Cable vs. Broadcast), WALL ST. J., May 5,
2000, at A16.
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then. In addition, several companies have begun to deploy microwave
multipoint distribution system ("MMDS"), a fixed wireless technology,
often called wireless cable, that can transmit multiple television channels
and data transmission to provide broadband access to the Internet.*
3
Wireless technologies represent the greatest potential for competition
in local telephone markets and the most immediate threat to the PSTN.
Cellular technology began in this country in the 1970s44 In 1984, the FCC
granted two cellular licenses in each market area, one to the ILEC and the
other by lottery. Many cite the use of additional electromagnetic spectrum
allocated by license auction in 1993-94 for cellular and personal
communications services ("PCS"), the digital counterpart to cellular as a
key step toward unleashing investment in wireless technologies.45
Technological advances in manufacturing provided the second key
element in unleashing this explosive growth. Two economists have
observed, "Cellular telephones sold for $4,200 in 1984; they're down to
less than $100 today. Some deals are even sweeter: The telephones
themselves are often free to customers who sign on with a service
provider.' 6 In 1984, there were just 92,000 subscribers to cellular
telephone service. By June 1999, it had more than 75 million subscribers.
The average monthly bill dropped from $96.83 in 1987 to just $45.15 in
43. Nicole Harris, AT&T's High Wireless Act: Can It Deliver the Web and a Dial
Tone? WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2000, at B1; see also Catherine Greenman, Life in the Slow
Lane, N.Y. TIMS, May 19,2000, at G8.
Sprint Broadband Wireless Group is testmarketing Sprint Broadband Direct in
Phoenix, a multichannel multipoint service the company says is 36 times as fast as
a regular dial-up connection. It relies on radio transmission rather than phone or
cable lines, and it works with a two-way digital transceiver installed on a rooftop
that is pointed toward a radio tower to send and receive signals.
Id.
44. A. MICHAEL NOLL, HIGHWAY Op DREAMS 124 (1997).
45. The worst corporate mistake made in the history of telecommunications-or at least
since William Orton, president of Western Union, rejected the opportunity to buy the
original Bell telephony patents for $100,000, saying, "What use could this company make of
an electric toy?"---was the failure of AT&T to retain the cellular technology as part of its
long-distance operations prior to the 1984 divestiture. TELEWARS, supra note 22, at 46 n.4.
According to Reed Hundt, former FCC Chairman, AT&T
paid more than $10 billion to buy McCaw Cellular Communications, Inc., the
largest wireless company in America, assembled by Craig McCaw in the early
1980s. Now, McCaw's team, led by Wayne Perry, pushed AT&T to buy more
licenses in the auction so as to complete their national footprint in the wireless
business and permit them to compete against Sprint and the Bell wireless
companies. A half-dozen years later, under the new CEO Mike Armstrong, AT&T
found that the licenses won in the auction were an essential part of the armory for
battling the local Bell companies for customers.
REED HUNDT, YOU SAY YOU WANT A REVOLUTION 95-96 (2000).
46. W. MICHAEL Cox & RICHARD ALM, MYTHs oFRICH & POOR 45 (1999).
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June 2000.41
Most industry analysts project that wireless telephony will continue to
grow at a fast pace.41 With prices steadily dropping, handsets becoming
virtually weightless, batteries improving, coverage of areas improving
(fewer roaming charges, for example), and new services emerging, such as
Internet connections, most experts expect the demand for wireless
telephony to continue to grow and usage to increase. The average number
of minutes of use increased from 115 minutes per month in 1996 to
approximately 400 per month in 1999.49 In that same year, two percent of
people using a wireless telephone said it was their only telephone,
compared to less than one percent in 1998! 0
Wireless telephony began as a supplement to the PSTN. A call from a
cell phone to a wireline phone passes through the local exchange network,
and vice versa.5' Calls made from a cell phone to another cell phone,
however, do not flow through the PSTN. For this reason, many experts
predict that the subsequent development of wireless networks will define
the future of telephony. 2 The robust trend in developing wireless networks
• 53
and the underlying engineering logic are persuasive, but the prospect for
growth raises a new and important issue to public regulators. If the PSTN
continues to provide social utility, how can public regulators maintain its
high quality and reliability to benefit society as the twin forces of
competition and technological innovation sweep us into a new era of
47. TRENDS, supra note 19, at 12-1. The Cellular Telecommunications & Internet
Association reports 97 million subscribers in June 2000. LOCAL TELEPHONE COMPETITION,
supra note 36, at 2 n.8.
48. An estimated 90 million Americans had cellular telephones, and 30,000 new
subscribers were signing up daily. See Cell Phones Source of Radiation Fears, at
http://www.cnn.com/2000US/07/18/cell.phone.fears.02 (last visited Jan. 22, 200 1).
49. Steve Rosenbush, More Using Cell Instead of Home Phones, USA TODAY, July 28,
1999, at Al.
50. Id.
51. The terms for transporting a call from one network to another constitute part of the
voluntarily negotiated interconnection agreement between the two companies.
52. One 1995 prediction hit the target:
The rapid development of wireless technologies and their declining costs provide
opportunities for developing a truly contestable local telephone industry. Forecasts
of the growth of the wireless telephone have proved far too conservative .... By
the end of the century, there will likely be one wireless telephone for every three
Americans and Canadians.
ROBERT W. CRANDALL & LEONARD WAVERMAN, TALK IS CHEAP: THE PROMISE OF
REGULATORY REFORM IN NORTH AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 241 (1995).
53. NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL 24 (1995) (explaining the "Negroponte
Switch" as the idea that 'the information currently coming through the ground (read, wires)
will come in the future through the ether, and the reverse. Namely, what is in the air will go
into the ground and what is in the ground will go into the air.").
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telecommunications?
Perhaps most social communications will be digital in the future.5 5 If
so, how can the structural integrity of the PSTN be maintained during this
transitional period? Put polemically, will the PSTN, subject to
discriminatory taxation by state and local governments 6 and heavy
regulation at the federal and state levels 7 become the bankrupted railroads
of the twenty-first century?' s
54. Maintaining the integrity of the PSTN, as a priority objective of regulators, is
generally understood. Yet, policies reflect this principle better when the FCC imposes
universal service support requirements on wireless carriers as opposed to when the FCC
reaffirms that enhanced services are exempt from paying access fees to the local exchange
carriers. See Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Report to Congress, 13 F.C.C.R.
11,501, par. 64, 11 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1312 (1998). "It is important that regulators
encourage transformation of the [public switched network] from primarily a voice network
into one which can process any type of traffic desired whether it be voice, data, or video."
POLICIES ON PRICING AND UNIVERSAL SERVICE, supra note 16, at 37.
55. "Like a force of nature, the digital age cannot be denied or stopped. It has four very
powerful qualities that will result in its ultimate triumph: decentralizing, globalizing,
harmonizing, and empowering." NEGROPONTE, supra note 53, at 229.
56. See COMM. ON STATE TAxATiON, 50-STATE STUDY AND REPORT ON
TELECOMMUCATIONS TAXATION (1999); see also TELEWARS, supra note 22, at 116.
For most of this century, telephone companies were regulated monopolies. As
such, they and other public utilities were convenient sources of revenue for state
and local governments. Indeed, regulators generally allowed taxes on public
utilities to be passed through to ratepayers. State and local taxes had little
incidence on corporate profits, because regulators were using rate of return (not
unlike a cost-plus approach) to set telephone and utility rates. This was a sweet
deal for state and local administrators. Few companies protested very long or very
hard, because most of the tax burden was simply passed along.
Id.
57. Robert W. Crandall, Waves of the Future: Are We Ready to Deregulate
Telecommunications, BROOKINGs REV., Winter 1996, at 29.
The question is why we need federal regulation of voice, data, or video services at
all when any of several companies can offer hundreds of video channels, local
wireless telephone services, or long-distance voice and data services. Each new
generation of technology can offer these services at a small fraction of the cost
incurred by the previous one, built just a few short years ago. Monopoly power
may exist in certain segments of the industry, particularly local telephony, but not
for long under these conditions as long as regulators do not stand in the way.
Id.
58. John Markoff, Ethernet Finds New Level, N.Y. TiMES, June 5,2000, at Cl.
Telephone industry technologies have been designed to ensure that data
packets carrying voice telephone calls have priority passage through the network,
even during peak traffic periods. That capability adds to the complexity and cost
of conventional telecommunications data networks, but it also gives voice
conversations a reliable sound quality that Ethernet or standard Internet formats
cannot yet match. But service providers like Yipes intend to plunge in to the
lucrative voice market by guaranteeing customers a minimum quality of service-
whether for voice or data-that the companies say they will be able to meet by
designing their networks to handle bursts of high-data traffic.
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The analog circuits of the PSTN face another challenge from
emerging data packet networks. The merger of computing and
communications, both of which employ binary data, will define the digital
future.5 9 Data can be transmitted in combinations of packets via the IP
quickly and cheaply. 6° Density and distance are the two cost factors that
affect voice transmission using analog circuits. 61 Neither physical attribute
has any bearing on the cost of data transmission using IP.62 The
technological advance of telephony using data packet transmission poses
the greatest long-term challenge to the established PSTN. 6' In the interim,
IP telephony will require access to the local loop, and the terms of that
access-a topic discussed in Part II of this Article-should become the top
priority of public regulators at the federal and state levels.
Two decades ago, the PSTN was a proprietary system owned and
maintained by monopoly providers, which were publicly regulated. As
cable television adapts its systems to offer telephony, the PSTN will
59. See FRANCES CAIRNCROSS, THE DEATH OF DISTANCE: How THE COMMUNICATIONS
REVOLUTION WILL CHANGE OUR LivEs (1997).
60. The conventional circuit-switched network uses an end-to-end path for each
transmission. In contrast, the Internet uses a "distributed packet-switched network, which
means that information is split up into small chunks or 'packets' that are individually routed
through the most efficient path to their destination." Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv.,
Report to Congress, 13 F.C.C.R. 11,501, para. 64, 11 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1312 (1998).
61. CRANDALL & WAVERMAN, supra note 52, at 80-84.
62. BRUCE M. OWEN, THE INTERNET CHALLENGE TO TELEVISION 178-79 (1999).
The interconnected networks that today make up the "backbones" of the Internet
are very different in structure from the telephone model. They are entirely digital.
Communications from one point to another do not utilize "connections" or open
channels between the points. Instead, each message is processed by the computer
at its point of origin into bundles of bits called "packets." Each packet (of perhaps
a few hundred bits) contains a small part of the message content . . Each packet is
transmitted to the nearest "router." A router has much the same function as a
switch, except that it does not establish connections. Each router in the system is
connected to several other routers. As packets arrive at a router, the router decides
by which transmission path to send them onward toward their final destination.
Typically, many paths are available.
Id.
63. Seth Schiesel, Cisco Takes Internet Phones to Next Stage, N.Y. TIMES, March 27,
2000, at C4.
Cisco intends to announce an office telephone system based on Intemet
technology. The system, which transmits voice calls in the electronic language of
the Internet, could push the company to the top of the budding Internet-telephone
market. Proponents say such systems bring new convenience, efficiency and cost-
savings to corporate communications.... ."The networks that can't do data, voice
and video are dinosaurs," Mr. Chambers [of Cisco] said in an interview on Friday.
"We're going to see open standards for any new telecommunications or computer
product to connect to one network. This is the first gauntlet thrown down in that
direction."
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interconnect with them. Currently, wireless telephony networks supplement
and complement the PSTN, but in the not-so-distant future, wireless
telephony will certainly compete with, and perhaps supplant, the PSTN.
Regardless, voice telephony via IP will be the next great revolution in
telecommunications, 64 and pose a far greater challenge to those responsible
for maintaining the integrity of the PSTN.65
II. DUAL REGULATION OF THE PSTN
The United States is the only nation with a dual system of public
regulation of its telephone network.66 "In 1907, Wisconsin and New York
became the first states to regulate the telephone companies, preempting
cities that had granted the initial franchise authority to both Bell and
independent companies. 67 In cities with populations of more than 5,000 at
the beginning of the twentieth century, more than half of the Bell
exchanges had local competitors. Twenty-six states enacted laws between
1907 and 1913 mandating the physical interconnection of competingtelepone .68
telephone companies. Nevertheless, the frustrations of having dual
telephone systems that did not interconnect proved a compelling argument
that granting an exclusive franchise to one monopoly provider, regulated by
64. Thus far, voice over Internet protocol ("VoIP") has caused a rather modest shift of
traffic away from traditional long-distance and international carriers. In the short term, its
greatest application will be by corporations with multiple locations that lease private
(virtual) networks from traditional carriers, which will result in substantial cost savings.
Jennings, supra note 11, at 7. See, e.g., Margret Johnston, ComNet: AT&T Launches VoIP
Porfolio (Jan. 30, 2001), at http://www.nwfusion.comlnews200l/0l130attvoip.html (stating
that "[AT&T] is offering voice-over-IP retail services for business, allowing the
combination of voice, fax and data traffic on a single integrated IP connection managed by
AT&T').
65. JASON OXMAN, THE FCC AND THE UNREGULATION OF TiE INTERNET 25-26 (Office
of Plans and Policy FCC, Working Paper -No. 31, 1999), at http://www.fcc.govl
Bureaus/OPP/workingpapers/oppwp31.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2001).
As bypasses to the monopoly local network, like satellite, wireless, and cable, are
increasingly available, and IP technologies over a variety of media make the
single pipe into the home seem like the distant past, there will undoubtedly be
calls for the Commission to step in and level the playing field ... Where once data
communications were offered "over" the voice network, the network of the future
promises voice services as just another data offering.
Id.
66. Paul Teske, Introduction and Overview, in AMERICAN REGULATORY FEDERALISM &
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INSAsmucru 3, 4 (Paul Teske ed., 1995) [hereinafter
Introduction and Overview].
67. David Gabel, Federalism: An Historical Perspective, in AMERICAN REGULATORY
FEDERALISM & TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRAsTRUCTURE 19, 34 (Paul Teske ed., 1995).
68. RiCHARD H.K VIETOR, CONTRIVED COMPETITION: REGULATION AND DEREGULATION
IN AMERICA 171 (1994).
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the public, was superior to competition among rival systems. 69 Not
coincidentally, it was also the argument made by Theodore Vail, the head
of AT&T, whose slogan was "One Policy, One Service, Universal
Service.,
70
When Congress enacted the Mann-Elldns Act in 1910 (to reform
railroad regulation), it gave the Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC")
authority to regulate telephone and telegraph companies as "common
carriers. Rates were to be "just and reasonable. 72 Federal regulation was
limited to interstate commerce, and most historians conclude that the ICC
was an ineffective regulator. Two federal actions during this formative
period merit a brief word: the Kingsbury Commitment73 and the Willis-
Graham Act of 1921. 74 While the former relied upon the antitrust law to
prevent AT&T's aggressive effort to consolidate this industry, the latter
reversed course and allowed the consolidation of the telephone companies.
69. See id. "Competition resulted in duplication of investment, the necessity for the
business man maintaining two or more telephones, economic waste to the company,
increased burden, and consequent continuous loss to the subscriber. The policy of the state
was to eliminate this by eliminating as far as possible[] duplication." Id.
70. Id.; see also MILTON L. MUELLER, JR., UNIVERSAL SERVICE: COMPETION,
INTERCONNECrION, AND MONOPOLY IN THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN TELEPHONE SYSTEM
153-70 (1996).
71. Commerce Court (Mann-Elkins) Act, Pub. L. No. 218, ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539, 544
(1910) (amending Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, § 1, 24 Stat. 379, 379 (1887))
(provisions relating to telegraph, telephone, and cable companies repealed by
Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652,48 Stat. 1064).
72. VIETOR, supra note 68, at 171.
73. Id. at 172.
In 1912, in response to widespread complaints, the U.S. Department of Justice
began investigating AT&T's competitive practices.... In December 1913[,]
Nathan Kingsbury, a vice-president of AT&T, outlined the terms of this
agreement in a letter to the attorney general. There were three key provisions.
First, AT&T would sell Western Union, which it had acquired in 1909. Second, it
would cease buying up independent telephone companies "operating in
competition with the Bell System." And third, it would henceforth allow qualified
phone lines to connect with the Bell System, for interexchange and long-distance
service.
Id.
74. Willis-Graham Act of 1921, ch. 20, 42 Stat. 27 (repealed by Communications Act
of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064, 1102). Vietor set out the history of this Act:
In 1921[,] Congress obliged by passing the Willis-Graham Act, which explicitly
permitted consolidation of competing telephone companies. Competition,
evidently, was out of vogue. 'It is believed to be better policy," declared
Representative William J. Graham (a Republican from Illinois), "to have one
telephone system in a community that serves all the people, even though it may be
at an advanced rate, properly regulated by State boards or commissions, than it is
to have two competing telephone systems." The Senate Commerce Committee
simply asserted that "telephoning is a natural monopoly."
VIETOR, supra note 68, at 173.
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Most states had established public utility commissions ("PUCs") soon
75
after World War I to regulate local and intrastate telephone services.
Motivations underlying this approach included consumer protection (i.e.,
the concern that telephone companies might use their market power to
overcharge consumers); the desire for rival networks to physically
interconnect to eliminate duplication and increase the value of these
networks to more users; and the progressive notion that state regulation of
business was an enlightened policy for expanding and improving quasi-
76public goods such as telephone services. Despite creating PUCs to act in
the public interest, state legislatures found little success in attempting to
define this public interest or explaining how it might be achieved.77
The Communications Act of 1934 ("1934 Act") created the FCC to
regulate long-distance telephone service, shifting that responsibility from
the ICC and the radio broadcasting industry (replacing the Federal Radio
Commission).78 Contrary to conventional wisdom, the preamble to the 1934
Act did not establish universal service as a primary social objective.79
Indeed, the rising affluence of American society during the last two-thirds
of the twentieth century had a greater impact on expanding access to basic
telephone services (as measured by the rising percentage of households
with telephones) than the actions of public regulators during this period.0
75. "[S]tate regulatory commissions were first created in the late 1880s (in
Massachusetts) but then were inaugurated with sudden uniformity in the decade and a half
following 1907.... [B]y 1922, electric regulatory commissions had been introduced in
thirty-seven of the forty-eight states and gas commissions in eighteen of twenty large
states." George L. Priest, The Origins of Utility Regulation and the 'Theories of Regulation'
Debate, 36 J.L. & EcoN. 289, 296 (1993).
76. TELEWARS, supra note 22, at 49-50.
77. Gabel, supra note 67, at 25.
Neither the hearings nor the legislation that authorized the establishment of state
public utility commissions (PUCs) provides much insight into the policies that the
legislature wanted the PUCs to pursue. Although they were clearly concerned that
rates be "fair," there was little guidance as to how these agencies should balance
fairness with policies that promoted the state's infrastructure. Instead, as is often
the case with the U.S. legislative process, broad authority was granted to the
delegated agency.
Id. See also Bob Rowe, Substance Plus Process-Telecom Regulation Reforms to Protect
Consumers, Preserve Universal Service, and Promote Competition, 71 U. CoLo. L. REv.
879 (2000).
78. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652,48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
79. MuELLER, supra note 70, at 247-68. "The subject of universal service, in either its
modem or classical sense, did not appear in the deliberations." Id at 256.
80. Id. at 259-60. "lt took more than 70 years for the telephone to penetrate half of
American households. In 1920, 35 percent had telephones; in 1940, 36.9 percent did; in
1960, 78.3 percent; and in 1980 and again in 1990, 93 percent. Currently, about 94.3 percent
of U.S. households have telephones." TELEWARS, supra note 22, at 47 n.9.
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Sections 1 and 2(a) of the 1934 Act gave the FCC exclusive authority
• • • 81
to regulate interstate communications. The states were concerned that this
new federal agency would preempt their authority to regulate intrastate
communications and were successful in getting sections 2(b) and 221(b)
added, which preserved state authority over "charges, clarifications,
practices, or regulations for or in connection with intrastate common
carriage. Hence, the regime of dual regulation continued, and perhaps for
good reason; in 1934, ninety-eight percent of all calls were intrastate.83 Yet,
Henry Geller, a former General Counsel to the FCC, observed pungently:
"[N]owhere does the [1934] Act come to grips with the stark reality that the
same telephone plant is used to carry both interstate and intrastate traffic." 84
If the PSTN provides three services-long-distance calls across state
borders, intrastate toll calls, and local calls-how should public regulators
apportion the costs of these services? This issue of separations has
befuddled several generations of economists and regulators. In 1930, the
Supreme Court heard appellants in a Chicago rate case contend that "local
rates were too high because all the cost of the fixed plant was allocated to
intrastate service. ''85 In Smith v. Illinois Bell, the Court determined that
"because toll calls required the existence of local networks, toll call prices
should include a contribution toward paying these local costs."'16 For the
last seven decades, the separations issue has dominated the agenda of
public regulators."
The primary interests of both state and federal regulators were aligned
during most of the middle third of the twentieth century. Eli Noam presents
this excellent summary:
81. Communications Act of 1934 §§ 1, 2,47 U.S.C. §§ 151,152 (1994 & Supp. IV
1998).
82. Eli Noam, The Federal-State Friction Built into the 1934 Act and Options for
Reform, in AMERICAN REGULATORY FEDERALISM & TELECOMMUNICATIONS
INFRASTRUCTURE 113-14 (Paul Teske ed., 1995) [hereinafter Federal-State Friction].
83. Id. at 120.
84. Henry Geller, Legal Issues in Preemption, in AMERICAN REGULATORY FEDERALISM
& TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCrURE 125, 127 (Paul Teske ed., 1995).
85. VIETOR, supra note 68, at 180.
86. Introduction and Overview, supra note 66, at 7-8; see Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel.
Co., 282 U.S. 133 (1930).
While the difficulty in making an exact apportionment of the property is apparent,
and extreme nicety is not required, only reasonable measures being essential... it
is quite another matter to ignore altogether the actual uses to which the property is
put. It is obvious that, unless an apportionment is made, the intrastate service to
which the exchange property is allocated will bear an undue burden-to what
extent is a matter of controversy.
Id. at 151.
87. For an explanation of the current status of this accounting challenge, see Rowe,
supra note 77, at n.36.
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Where emerged from the late 1930s and into the 1970s a remarkable
system of co-regulation, characterized by a substantial cooperative
spirit. The states were mostly in charge of local service; the FCC was
mostly in charge of long-distance service. Both were solicitous of
AT&T, which steadily extended service throughout the nation at
declining real rates and established what was widely recognized as the
best telephone system in the world. Moreover, AT&T's financial
stability throughout this period made it a model investment for many
Americans 8creating still another broad constituency in favor of the
status quo.
What Noam politely and accurately calls the era of "co-regulation"
might be called collusion by most economists and a few revisionist
historians.89 Throughout this period, an increasing share of the costs of
maintaining the PSTN was allocated to long-distance service. This
provided the cross-subsidy that kept rates for residential services low.
Federal regulators acquiesced in allocating costs to long distance because,
according to Noam, they "had the rare privilege to preside over an industry
segment whose prices dropped as performance rose."90 By 1980, less than
eight percent of telephone usage was long-distance, while twenty-six
percent of the telephone plant cost was allocated to interstate long-
distance. 91
Beginning in the 1960s and throughout the 1970s, the interests of
state regulators (primarily to keep residential rates low) were aligned with
the interests of AT&T (to prevent competition in terminal equipment and in
long-distance services). Protecting the secure revenue stream from these
restricted activities was essential to the company and provided the cross-
subsidy for low residential rates. The FCC, however, gradually
demonstrated a more tolerant view of allowing competition to emerge in
these restricted markets.92
The unraveling of co-regulation began with the FCC's 1968
Carterfone Device ruling, which allowed subscriber-owned terminal
equipment to connect to the PSTN.93 Led by North Carolina, several states
challenged the authority of this FCC decision. In their view, the authority
88. Federal-State Friction, supra note 82, at 115.
89. The FCC could have lowered long-distance rates to reflect the declining costs of
this service, but that would have pushed local residential rates higher. Instead, the FCC
allowed long-distance rates to remain stable, allowing them to generate a growing share of
total telephone costs.
90. Federal-State Friction, supra note 82, at 116.
91. VIETOR, supra note 68, at 183.
92. See Robert W. Crandall, AFrER THE BREAKUP: U.S. TELECOMMUNIcATIONs IN A
MoRE CoMPErrnE ERA 19-22 (1991).
93. See Use of Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, 13 FCC.2d 420,
13 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 597 (1968).
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to regulate terminal equipment fell within the powers delegated to the states
in section 2(b)(1) of the 1934 Act, which provides that "nothing in this Act
shall be construed . . . to apply or to give the [FCC] jurisdiction with
respect... to intrastate communication service... of any carrier. ' 94 The
handset in the customer's home affected interstate communications, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded, upholding the FCC's authority
on this matter.95 Indeed, the court suggested that state jurisdiction was
limited to local services, facilities, and matters "that in their nature and
effect are separable from and do not substantially affect the conduct or
development of interstate communications. 96  This ruling, Noam
concludes, "in effect mooted the 1934 Act's separation of intrastate and
interstate that had been the legal linchpin of the cooperative system.
97
The second development that split public regulators was the Execunet
decision that allowed rival long-distance carriers to interconnect with the
traditional telephone network.9 Many state public utility commissioners
had long opposed competitive entry into the long-distance market because
AT&T's revenue stream was artfully used, through the separations process,
to subsidize residential rates.99 State regulators were also unhappy with the
FCC's approach to reform the separation process following the divestiture
of AT&T because of the 1982 consent decree.' ° In 1984, the FCC imposed
[a] new system of access charges that provided a uniform method for
local telephone companies to charge long distance carriers for the
origination and termination of interstate traffic on their local networks.
In addition, monthly subscriber line charges (SLCs) were introduced to
recover a portion of the fixed costs of the local telephone companies'
loops directly from end users on a per-line basis.'
0
'
Many state regulators opposed the AT&T divestiture and the new
SLCs because they did not want local telephone bills to increase.r
Nevertheless, the public widely felt the rate shock of divestiture. The Bell
94. 47 U.S.C. § 152(b)(1) (1994).
95. North Carolina Utils. Comm'n v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1976).
96. Id. at 793.
97. Federal-State Friction, supra note 82, at 116.
98. Id. at 117; see also MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
("Execunet F'); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("Execunet
IF').
99. Federal-State Friction, supra note 82, at 116-17.
100. For a good summary of the consent decree, known as the Modified Final Judgment,
see GERALD W. BROCK, TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY FOR THE INFORMATION AGE 161-72
(1996).
101. TRENDS, supra note 19, at 1-3.
102. Roger G. Noll, State Regulatory Responses to Competition and Divestiture in the
Telecommunications Industry, in ANTITRUST AND REGULATION 165 (Ronald E. Grieson ed.,
1986).
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companies requested $7 billion in rate increases during the eighteen months
following the Modified Final Judgment' 3 Sharon Nelson, a Washington
state regulator, divided this period into three Rs. The first was "reaction" to
divestiture.' 4 The late 1980s was a period of "retrenchment," in part
because the 1986 Tax Reform Act reduced the taxes paid by the local
105telephone companies. Nelson predicted that the third R in the 1990s
would be a "restructuring" phase that would include innovative regulatory
policies and the deregulation of competitive services. 6
A. The Adverse Effects Test and FCC Preemption of State Authority
The courts have often sustained federal preemption by the FCC, much
to the displeasure of the state PUCs. In Brookhaven Cable TV, Inc. v. Kelly,
the Second Circuit sustained the FCC's preemption of "state and local price
regulation of special pay cable programming."' 07 In Capital Cities Cable,
Inc. v. Crisp, the Supreme Court sustained FCC preemption "when
compliance with both state and federal law is impossible.... or when the
state law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress."'' 08 And in City of New York v.
FCC, the Court sustained the FCC preemption of state technical standards
governing cable television."9 Following the logic of Carterfone, the FCC's
Arco decision, which allowed users to interconnect with the local exchange
when it is "privately beneficial without being publicly detrimental,"'10 was
also upheld by the D.C. Circuit.' Noam contends that this ruling "marked
a significant step toward breaking the grip of state jurisdiction on
103. Id. at 166; PAUL TESKE, AFrER DrVEsTrruRE: THE POLrHCAL ECONOMY OF STATE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION 40 (1990) [hereinafter AFrERDIvEsTITURE].
State regulators approved $10.5 billion in rate hikes from 1982 to 1986, out of $70
billion in annual [Bell operating companies] revenues. The high-water point of
these increases was 1984 in which $3.9 billion in rate hikes were approved,
representing 53 percent of telephone company requests.... Thus, the telephone
companies sought substantial rate relief in the five years after the Consent Decree
and state regulators granted about half of the requests.
Id.
104. Sharon L. Nelson, Policy Directions for the Future, in AFrERTHE BREAKUP:
ASSESSING THE NEW POST-AT&T DIVTrrTURE ERA 66, 67-75 (Barry G. Cole ed., 1991).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See Geller, supra note 84, at 125-33; Brookhaven Cable TV, Inc. v. Kelly, 573 F.2d
765, 767 (2d Cir. 1978).
108. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699 (1984) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
109. City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1988).
110. At. Richfield Co., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 3 F.C.C.R. 3089, para.1, 64
Rad. Reg.2d (P&F) 1535 (1988).
111. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Tex. v. FCC, 886 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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switching."" 12
These decisions reflected an "adverse effects test" first articulated in
North Carolina Utilities Commission v. FCC."3 If the FCC could establish
that a state action adversely affected a matter that the Commission had
authority to supervise, then the courts would sustain the federal
preemption. The courts moved away from the adverse effects test in
Louisiana"4 and California."5 The FCC had tried to preempt the states
from using more liberal depreciation rules in setting local rates. The
Supreme Court in Louisiana ruled that section 2(b) granted state authority
on this issue. There were, said the Court, "two hands on the steering
wheel."" 6 According to the Court, section 2(b) limits the FCC's power
because it "fences off from FCC reach or regulation intrastate matters-
indeed, including matters 'in connection with' intrastate service."" 7 In
California, the Ninth Circuit disapproved of the federal preemption of state
regulation of intrastate common carrier services provided on FM subcarrier
frequencies, despite the FCC's argument that "state action would conflict
with the public interest licensing determination of the FCC, restrict the
beneficial use of the radio spectrum, and frustrate the FCC's efforts to
encourage competition.". This court relied upon the original interpretation
of section 2(b) in overruling the FCC, yet it noted that the FCC had made
"a persuasive case in support of its policy objective, but that case must be
made to Congress and not to this court."'' 9
Congress did not take very long to heed this message. In the Omnibus
112. Federal-State Friction, supra note 82, at 118.
113. Noam used this term to summarize North Carolina Utils. Comm'n v. FCC, 537 F.2d
787, 793 (4th Cir. 1976). "The court said, in essence, that if the FCC believed a state's
action was adversely affecting federal regulation, the court would support the FCC."
Federal-State Friction, supra note 82, at 119.
The Commission must remain free to determine what terminal equipment can
safely and advantageously be interconnected with the interstate communications
network and how this shall be done. We have no doubt that the provisions of
section 2(b) deprive'the Commission of regulatory power over local services,
facilities and disputes that in their nature and effect are separable from and do not
substantially affect the conduct or development of interstate communications. But
beyond that, we are not persuaded that section 2(b) sanctions any state regulation,
formally restrictive only of intrastate communication, that in effect encroaches
substantially upon the Commission's authority under sections 201 through 205.
North Carolina Utils. Comm'n, 537 F.2d at 793 [emphasis added].
114. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355 (1986).
115. California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990).
116. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 476 U.S. at 364.
117. Id. at 370.
118. Geller, supra note 84, at 129; see California v. FCC, 798 F.2d 1515 (D.C. Cir.
1986).
119. California, 798 F.2d at 1518.
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Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993,120 Congress "amended Section 332 of
the [1934] Act... to mandate regulatory parity for all commercial mobile
radio services and to foreclose state regulation of those services in certain
areas.'' This new provision gave the FCC express authority to regulate
traditional radio common carriers and competitive private carriers, and
preempted state and local governments from regulating "the entry of or the
rates charged by any commercial mobile service or any private mobile
service." Hence, Congress had "removed from state purview all rate or
entry regulation of the fastest growing segment of the telecommunications
industry. . . . It did so in the belief that the traditional jurisdictional
demarcation mandated by Section 2(b) would prove unworkable for mobile
services, which . . . 'by their nature, operate without regard to state
lines.,
, 123
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act") sought to
promote competition; 24 to achieve this goal, section 253(a) declares, "No
State or local statute or regulation, or other State or local legal requirement,
may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to
provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service."' 125 The last
clause of this section gives the FCC authority to preempt any state or local
126
action that violates (a) or (b) of section 253 . Clearly, Congress was
granting substantial authority to the FCC to preempt state or local actions
that prevented competition in telecommunications service. This
unambiguous language reflects the national policy priority given to
competition, superseding the traditional state role in regulating local
120. Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 6002, 107 Stat. 312, 392 (1993).
121. Jeffrey Tobias, "Notwithstanding Section 2(B)...": Recent Legislative Initiatives
Affecting the Federal-State Balance in Telecommunications Regulation, in AMERICAN
REGULATORY FEDERALISM & TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE 133, 134 (Paul Teske
ed., 1995).
122. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A) (1994).
123. Tobias, supra note 121, at 135 [citation omitted].
124. The 1996 Act was designed "[itlo promote competition and reduce regulation in
order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications
consumers .... ." Telecommunications Act of 1996, Preamble, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110
Stat. 56, 56.
125. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 253(a), 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (Supp. IV 1998).
126. Section 253(d) states:
Preemption-If, after notice and an opportunity for public comment, the
Commission determines that a State or local government has permitted or imposed
any statute, regulation, or legal requirement that violates subsection (a) or (b) of
this section, the Commission shall preempt the enforcement of such statute,
regulation, or legal requirement to the extent necessary to correct such violation or
inconsistency.
Id. § 253(d).
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telephone service.' 27 At the time of the enactment of the 1996 Act, as many
as twenty states had some regulation, statute, or constitutional provision
• 128
that prohibited competition in local telephone service.
Section 251 of the 1996 Act spells out the three pathways of
competition: facilities-based competition, resale, and UNEs. To facilitate
this new era of competition, this section describes the interconnection
requirements of telecommunications carriers. 9 Section 252 of the 1996
Act established the process for implementing these interconnection
agreements among various carriers, including an important role for the state
-. 130
commissions in mediating and arbitrating disputes. This legislation
granted the FCC substantial authority to promulgate the new rules
necessary to implement the many features of this important initiative. The
Local Competition Order3 provoked huge controversies on pricing issues
and, of course, on the jurisdictional question.
The ILECs opposed the FCC pricing rules, arguing that the forward-
looking economic approach to pricing constituted a regulatory taking./32
The state commissions opposed the FCC rulemaking, because they claimed
section 252 retained state authority over retail prices and service. The states
were willing to accept advice from the FCC on matters such as wholesale
pricing rules, but argued that the FCC did not have the authority to impose
a pricing methodology on the states.' The Eighth Circuit issued a stay on
the FCC rules, and then overturned most of them, ruling that the
127. After embracing competition, the legislation also reaffirmed the state role in
regulating intrastate telephone services:
Nothing in this section shall affect the ability of a State to impose, on a
competitively neutral basis and consistent with section 254 of this title,
requirements necessary to preserve and advance universal service, protect the
public safety and welfare, ensure the continued quality of telecommunications
services, and safeguard the rights of consumers.
Id. § 253(b).
128. TELEWARS, supra note 22, at 79.
129. 47 U.S.C. § 251.
130. Id. § 252.
131. See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 and Interconnection Between Local Exchange Cariers and Commercial Mobile
Radio Service Providers, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499, 4 Comm. Reg. (P &
F) 1 (1996).
132. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999), cert. granted sub nom.
Verizon Comms., Inc. v. FCC, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 947 (Jan. 22, 2001). See J. GREGORY
SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRAcT:
THE COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF NETwORK INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES
(1998); see also David Gabel & David Rosenbaum, Who's Taking Whom: Some Comments
and Evidence on the Constitutionality of TELRIC, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 239 (March 2000).
133. "While the rules were stayed, states generally adopted the FCC's TELRIC rules
voluntarily." Rowe, supra note 77, at 891 n.40.
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Commission had exceeded its authority. 34 In a decisive victory for the
FCC, the Supreme Court in 1999 upheld the FCC's jurisdiction and most
aspects of its Order.3 5 The Court conceded that the 1996 Act was vague in
some respects, but affirmed the FCC's rulemaking authority to implement
the local competition provisions of the Act. 16 If there remain "two hands
on the steering wheel," then the FCC's firm grip clearly dominates.
B. Summary of Historical Themes
This broad review of a century of dual regulation of the telephone
system presents several major themes.137 Twice regulatory powers were
passed to a higher level of government. At the beginning of the twentieth
century, when telephony was expanding beyond city borders, the states
formed PUCs to regulate the terms and conditions of public utilities, which
preempted city officials who granted municipal franchises to competing
telephone companies. At the end of the century, Congress granted
additional authority to the FCC, preempting the traditional authority of
state commissions to regulate intrastate telephone services and operations:
first, in 1993, with the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act to regulate
wireless telephony; and second with the 1996 Act, which promoted
competition in the local exchange markets.
Adding section 2(b) to the 1934 Act retained state jurisdiction for the
middle third of the twentieth century. The era of co-regulation thrived,
largely because the generous revenue stream from AT&T's protected
activities (long-distance service and equipment manufacturing) enabled it
to sustain investment in the infrastructure and provided mutual benefits to
134. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 800, 804-06 (8th Cir. 1997). The Court of
Appeals concluded that 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) and section 2(b) of the 1934 Act created a
presumption in favor of preserving state authority over intrastate communications-a
presumption it described as a fence "hog tight, horse high, and bull strong, preventing the
FCC from intruding on the states' intrastate turf." Id. at 800.
135. AT&T Corp., 525 U.S. 366.
136. Id. at 397.
137. A century ago, the governing institutions of this nation were not capable of
protecting competition in the telephone industry. During those first decades, the federal
government failed to use its antitrust authority to constrain the aggressive appetite of AT&T
as it bought rival telephone companies, and also failed to make meaningful efforts to
regulate long-distance services. See VIETOR, supra note 68, at 166-79. State commissions,
similarly, were unsuccessful in forcing interconnection between the Bell and independent
companies. See Gabel, supra note 67, at 20-28. These notable failures resulted in a regime
of publicly regulated monopoly providers, a system that unraveled in the last decades of the
twentieth century. The current policy of allowing competition in telecommunications will
require the prudent discipline of our governing institutions to create and preserve a level
playing field among providers that will enable investment, competition, and technological
innovation to flourish.
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the company and to society. When the FCC intermittently allowed
competition in these previously restricted markets (Carterfone in 1968 and
Execunet in 1977), these actions jeopardized the cross-subsidies that had
kept residential rates low. The FCC's cautious drift toward allowing
competition in previously restricted markets provoked the opposition of the
state commissions, ending the era of co-regulation.
The courts have generally upheld the FCC in most jurisdictional
disputes with state commissions. The adverse effects test (granting the
presumption in favor of the FCC) was pulled back by the Louisiana
decision that restored the original intent of section 2(b) of the 1934 Act.""
The 1999 Supreme Court decision upholding the FCC's authority to
implement rules guiding local competition strongly reaffirms the adverse
effects test. 39 In subsequent jurisdiction disputes, the FCC is likely to
prevail over the state commissions as long as the agency can establish that
state action is adverse to FCC policy priorities and those priorities flow
from federal law and powers given to it by Congress.
IV. ISP-BOUND TRAFFIC IS INTERSTATE:
WHO MAKES THE CALL?
Section 252 of the 1996 Act encourages voluntary agreements
between ILECs and new entrants. 140 These agreements establish the terms
and conditions for interconnection and each service or network element
made available by either party. This section articulated several important
functions to the state commissions facilitating these negotiations. Parties
may ask the state commissions to participate in these negotiations and
mediate differences.' 4 1 Similarly, the commissions may arbitrate open
issues, upon petition of either party, if negotiations are not successful. 42
Finally, "[a]ny interconnection agreement adopted by negotiation or
arbitration shall be submitted for approval to the State commission."'
143
Hundreds of interconnection agreements were negotiated in the months
following the passage of the 1996 Act.'44
"Reciprocal compensation" describes the negotiated or arbitrated cost
138. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355 (1986).
139. AT&T Corp., 525 U.S. 366.
140. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 252, 47 U.S.C. § 252(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1998).
141. Id. § 252(a)(2).
142. Id. § 252(b).
143. Id. § 252(e)(1).
144. In February 1997, the United States Telephone Association placed full-page
advertisements in national newspapers and magazines boasting that incumbents and new
competitors had negotiated 680 interconnection agreements. See, e.g., United States Tel.
Ass'n (advertisement), THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 3, 1997, at 8.
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of transporting local traffic from one network to another. In the first round
of interconnection agreements, the transport and termination fees ranged
from three-tenths to one cent per minute. Beginning in mid-1997, several
ILECs began to question some of the traffic flowing to the CLECs. Much
of this early traffic from incumbents to new rival companies was bound to
ISPs. The entrepreneurial CLECs were admittedly clever and fast. They
had aggressively recruited ISPs as clients for their new networks. 145 Before
competition emerged in most cities, a typical ISP would contract with the
incumbent for sufficient lines for unlimited incoming calls, and the ISP
would pay a monthly fee for these services. After the first round of
interconnection agreements were in place, the CLECs began offering
business lines to the ISPs at no charge, because they discovered that each
ISP-bound call (initiated by a consumer on the ILEC network, passed to the
CLEC, and transported to the ISP) would generate termination fees from
the ILEC. Sometimes CLECs would bid against each other to obtain ISPs
as their clients.
A typical voice call using a wireline telephone in 1996 averaged less
than five minutes. In that year, a typical dial-up call that accessed the
Internet via an ISP lasted eighteen minutes. 46 The CLECs collected
termination fees from the incumbents on a per-minute basis, simply for
transporting these calls from the incumbents' switches to the ISPs. In
extreme cases, CLECs collected more revenue from termination fees from
the ILECs than the consumers paid the ILECs for their monthly telephone
services. 47 Although this was not arbitrage or a scam,149 it was,
145. One carrier's Web page invited parties to offer "free internet access while getting
paid for it." Letter from B. Jeannie Fry, Director of Fed. Regulatory Affairs, SBC Comms.,
Inc. at Tab 5, cited in Declaratory Ruling, supra note 1, at 3704 n.78.
146. Declan McCullagh, Telco Terrorism, WIRED, June 1997, at 53, 54; see also AMIR
ATAI & JAMES GORDON, IMPACTS OF INTERNET TRAFFIC ON LEC NETwoRKs AND SwrrCHING
SYSTEMS, at 3, White Paper (Telcordia Technologies: Red Bank, N.J., June 1996), available
at http:llwww.itesf.comlresources/whitepapers/impact.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2001)
('Internet calls have a mean holding time of the order of 20 minutes.").
147. Many users log on to the Internet for extended periods each day. If the ILEC pays
one cent per minute to the CLEC for transporting these calls to the ISP, an hour a day online
totals $18.00 in compensation for a thirty-day month. The average urban household
expenditure for basic local telephone services in 1999 was $13.75. TRENDS, supra note 19,
tbl. 14.1.
148. "[The often simultaneous purchase and sale of the same or equivalent security (as
in different markets) in order to profit from price discrepancies." WEBSTER's NINTH NE v
COLLEGIATE DIcIONARY 99 (1987).
149. "[A] fraudulent or deceptive act or operation." Id at 1047. Less clear is a related
development: "[A] number of ISP's have been granted CLEC licenses by the FCC, making
a reciprocal compensation windfall that much easier. ILEC's complain this is a 'scam."'
FCC Decision Could Open Internet to Fed'l Regs, supra note 10. "The North Carolina
Commission recently put an end to a 'sham CLEC' operation that underscores the profitable
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nevertheless, perverse.150 Current policy discourages CLECs from seeking
residential customers, preventing competition in local telephony. If a
residential customer and an ISP receive services from the same provider,
then ILECs pay no reciprocal compensation. CLECs have a strong
economic incentive to avoid serving residential customers; doing so would
jeopardize the reciprocal compensation for these Internet calls.
Some ILECs protested, especially those serving urban populations
with heavy concentrations of Internet users. ILECs had negotiated
interconnection agreements in good faith, assuming traffic between the two
networks would be predominantly voice calls,'5 ' averaging five or six
minutes each. They had not expected that they would be transporting so
many calls through the CLECs into cyberspace, with each call averaging
three times longer than the normal voice call. The rapidly growing traffic to
access the Internet caused congestion in the central offices of the ILECs,
151
which forced them to increase network capacity.
153
arbitrage possibilities created by ordering reciprocal compensation." Sprint Comms. Co.,
L.P., Col. Pub. Utils. Comm., Decision No. C00-479, Docket No. 00B-011T, 2000 WL
689363, at *3 n.5 (May 5, 2000).
150. Perverse in three ways: First, this was a transfer of wealth from the ILECs to the
CLECs without any redeeming social benefit. To wit, consumers did not get lower ISP
access charges because the CLECs were receiving substantial revenues in the form of
reciprocal compensation from the ILECs; second, the leading beneficiaries of this
unintended act of income redistribution were concentrated in the largest urban areas with the
greatest concentrations of Internet users. Hence, the ISPs did the hard work of marketing
and providing their services to the public, while substantial revenue flowed to the "early
bird" CLECs that enlisted the ISPs as clients so that the volume of Internet access calls
would pass through their networks; and, though not readily apparent, the third perversion is
more significant because it actively discourages competition in local telephony. As long as
the CLEC obtains revenue from the ILEC for terminating these Internet calls, the CLEC will
have no incentive to provide residential service. If a residential customer and the ISP are
both customers of the same provider, then the ILEC makes no reciprocal compensation
payments.
151. 'These interconnection deals were clearly formed with voice traffic in mind." FCC
Decision Could Open Internet to Fed'l Regs, supra note 10.
152. See Laurent Belsie, Internet Glut Gives Phones a Busy Signal, THE CHRSTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, Dec. 23, 1996, at 4.
[T]housands of people in the San Francisco Bay area weren't able to complete
an everyday task: make a phone call. The reason, Pacific Bell says, is the
Internet... That poses a challenge for a local phone company like Pacific Bell.
It built its network to handle voice calls, which average three to four minutes.
But the company has found the average Internet calls lasts [sic] 28 minutes. And
with an increasing number of customers going on-line, the traffic is starting to
choke the system.
Id.
153. Id. "The underlying problem is that today's telephone network is engineered to
carry short voice calls, not long data communications. Upgrading this network will cost
billions of dollars. And neither the local telephone companies nor Internet access firms are
particularly eager to foot the bill." Id.
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The unhappy ILECs maintained that ISP-bound traffic was not
subject to terminating compensation because the calls were not local-they
did not terminate at the ISP. Indeed, because the calls accessed the Internet
at the ISP, they became interstate communications. For example, in July
1997, Ameritech "determined that calls to ISP numbers are access traffic,
not local exchange traffic, and refused to pay reciprocal compensation on
the calls.' 54 Ameritech put these disputed funds in escrow accounts until
the matter was resolved. Naturally, the CLECs argued that Ameritech had
violated their agreements: "The CLECs with complaints against Ameritech
in the Great Lake states say nothing in their interconnection contracts or
Ameritech tariffs that draw a distinction between local calls to ISP numbers
and local calls to other business numbers., 55 The CLECs asked the state
commissions to require the ILECs to resume paying reciprocal
compensation and to pay back compensation owed to them.
Thus, beginning in 1997, the state commissions faced this judgment
call: Were calls to ISPs local or were they interstate? At the annual meeting
that year of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
("NARUC"), "the states asserted they have jurisdiction over reciprocal
compensation on ISP calls because such calls are local in nature.' '16 Indeed,
by February 1999, "[t]wenty-nine states [had] ruled that dial-up calls to
ISPs are local and, therefore, are subject to reciprocal compensation
provisions in local network interconnection agreements.' 57
Several press accounts of this dispute portray the ILECs as greedy,
inept, stupid, or worse. Here is the conventional story line: First, ILECs
fought hard for transport and termination fees that were too high (above
cost). Second, they lost the ISP business to their new competitors. Third,
the ILECs were forced to run to the regulators for relief from rules they
themselves helped to make. Some journalists concluded, therefore, the
incumbents were "hoist on their own petard," and deserved no sympathy
for their plight. The wounds were self-inflicted. 1 8 This narrative made
154. Eight More States Address Reciprocal Compensation On ISP Local Calls, STATE
TELEPHONE REGULATION REPORT, Nov. 27, 1997, at 2 [hereinafter Eight More States
Address Reciprocal Compensation].
155. Id.
156. Id. at 3.
157. Herb Kirchhoff, FCC Order on ISP Calls Puts Reciprocal Compensation Issue
Back in States' Hands, STATE & LOcAL COMMs. REP., Mar. 5, 1999, at 1.
158. Eight More States Address Reciprocal Compensation, supra note 154, at 3.
ALTS Vice President and General Counsel Richard Metzger said the rules that
brought about the compensation imbalance on ISP traffic were largely the doing
of the incumbent Bell companies. Metzger said telcos such as Bell Atlantic
opposed CLECs' pleas for "bill and keep" interconnection arrangements, where
each local provider keeps all the revenue on a local call rather than
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good story-telling-hubris always makes great copy-but the economic
issues arising from the creation of interconnection agreements in any
network industry are better understood without this sophistry.
'"The only way you make money on the networking business is traffic.
The company that has the most traffic and the most content will attract the
most subscribers," noted C. Michael Armstrong, Chairman of AT&T. 59 As
noted above, the 1996 Act obligates ILECs to provide network elements
and interconnection agreements to their competitors, but they are not
required to subsidize the competitors.' 60 Regulators often endorse this "bill-
and-keep" method for interconnection pricing. Under this alternative to
mutual compensation based on traffic volume, each network bills and then
keeps the revenue from calls originating on its own network. The costs of
transporting and terminating local traffic that originates from another
network are not charged to that network, eliminating transaction costs. This
method works fairly and efficiently, however, only when the traffic
between two companies is roughly equivalent.
61
compensating the terminating local carrier. He said incumbents believed they
would get the lion's share of the local business of the ISPs. Instead, a great deal
of the ISP business was taken up by the CLECs. 'As a result, the Bell companies
now have to pay for terminating Internet traffic, something they didn't expect to
have to do,' Metzger said. 'In a world-class flip flop, Bell Atlantic complains
that it will pay CLECs $50 million to $100 million in 1998 for termination of
Internet calls.... Now that the Bells must pay [local competitors], they want to
renege on their debts and fight the very rules they originally lobbied for.'
Id
159. Hearing of the Advisory Commission on Electronic Commerce (Sept. 14, 1999)
(Statement of C. Michael Armstrong), available at http://www.ecommercecommission.org/
newYork/tr0914.htm.
160. This was the source of the controversy over the FCC's TELRIC pricing rules for
interconnection. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 336 (1999); Gabel &
Rosenbaum, supra note 132. But see SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 132, at 272.
[U]nder established takings jurisprudence, a breach of the regulatory contract,
including the mandatory unbundling of the utility's infrastructure, would
constitute a taking of property if not accompanied by offsetting mechanisms to
recover stranded costs and to end continuing incumbent burdens. The
government's unilateral repudiation of the regulatory contract would require the
payment of just compensation.
Id.
161. John Haring & Jeffrey H. Rohlfs, Telecommunications Pricing for Efficient Local
Competition, paper presented at the Telecommunications Policy Research Conference,
Solomons, Md. 3 (October 1996).
[B]ill-and-keep has serious defects. It creates artificial incentives for inefficient
and irreversible investments by competitive carriers.... [Bill-and-keep almost
guarantees the emergence of an inefficient industry structure. Bill-and-keep is
likely to result in a substantial transfer of wealth from the customers and
stockholders of [LECs] to the customers and stockholders of entrants. It can
accurately be described as a regulatory giveaway.
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The California PUC imposed bill-and-keep as an interim rule to begin
on January 1, 1996. 162Two ILECs, however, quickly realized that the costs
of transporting and terminating the vast number of calls originating from
the new entrants' networks outweighed the costs avoided by not having to
pay the transporting and termination costs of their calls flowing to smaller,
rival networks. In upholding this interim rule, the PUC concluded, "Even if
one assumed that 'bill-and-keep' would result in some cost to [the LECs],
this cost will most likely be small."
16
State regulators remain sympathetic to bill-and-keep because it
simplifies pricing, reduces transaction costs, and the FCC has adopted it as
a model for interconnection pricing between the wireline and wireless
providers. 64 It is, however, not a fair or efficient mechanism when an
incumbent's network (B) is disproportionately larger than the new entrant's
network (A). This is simply because (B) will complete far more calls from
(A) than (A) will terminate from (B). "[I]n local telephony bill-and-keep
will produce a lopsided system of implicit compensation, and hence a
substantial subsidy to entrants, until the market shares of A and B become
comparable."'
65
Id.
162. SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 132, at 247.
"Bill-and-keep' is a method by which each LEC and CLC terminates local
traffic for all other LECs and CLCs with which it interconnects, bearing its own
capital and operating costs for these functions. Under this approach, individual
LECs or CLCs theoretically bear a proportional share of the overall costs
associated with reciprocal traffic exchange.
Id. (quoting Competition for Local Exchange Service, 165 P.U.R.4th 127, 128 (Cal. Pub.
Utils. Comm'n 1995)). The second sentence above, however, is not correct. A large network
will terminate proportionately more of the traffic flowing between networks, ceteris
paribus, than the smaller networks would terminate.
163. Id.
164. Id. (citing Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial
Mobile Radio Service Providers, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 5020
(1996)). The rough parity of traffic volumes between these networks is the major reason that
bill-and-keep is an appropriate rule in this situation.
165. Id. at 248.
[Sluppose that 99 percent of calls are placed to subscribers on the network of
the [ILEC] B, and only 1 percent of calls are placed to subscribers on the
network of [CLEC] A. All other things being equal, a subscriber on A's system
would therefore need to terminate calls on B's network 99 percent of the time.
Under bill-and-keep, B would bear the cost of terminating all calls on its system,
including the cost of terminating 99 percent of all calls originating from A's
subscribers. Conversely, A would bear the cost of terminating the calls from B's
subscribers; but by assumption those calls constitute only 1 percent of the total
volume of calls placed. Thus, B would bear the cost of terminating 99 percent of
all traffic and avoid the cost of terminating only 1 percent. Conversely, A would
avoid the cost of terminating 99 percent of the calls that originated on its
Number 2]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
The ILECs rejected the bill-and-keep arrangement in this first round
of interconnection agreements for good business reasons.166
"Approximately [thirty] percent of a LEC's revenues are generated by just
1 percent of its customers."' 67 As one might expect, the CLECs' initial
subscribers were predominantly businesses in urban areas. 68 The
mathematics strongly indicate that traffic originating on the rival networks
(and flowing to the incumbents) would be many times greater than the
traffic originating on the incumbents' networks (and flowing to the CLECs'
networks). Bill-and-keep works well when traffic volumes between carriers
are roughly balanced. "9
Looking back on this first round of interconnection agreements,
apparently ILECs could not predict the ensuing popularity of the Internet
network. As A's share of the market grew, its percentage of termination costs
avoided would correspondingly fall.
Id. at 247-48.
166. Jon Van, Ruling: Internet CallsAre Local, CH. TRIB., July 23, 1998, at D1 (quoting
Michael Jankowski, a Washington-based communications lawyer):
The irony here is that when dominant local phone companies like Ameritech
negotiated these deals, they insisted on reciprocal payments. . . . [T]he
incumbent carriers wanted reciprocity because they figured they would be
handling 98 percent of these calls for the next decade or two and didn't want to
subsidize their competitors. They never anticipated it could come back to bite
them like this, and you can't blame them. I wouldn't have anticipated it, either.
167. INGO VOGELSANG & BRIDGER M. MITCHELL, TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPETITION:
THE LAST TEN MILEs 29 (1997) [citation omitted].
168. UNITED STATES GEN. AccouNTING OFFICE, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: DEVELOPMENT
OF COMPETITION IN LOCAL TELEPHONE MARKETS 16 (2000). Following the lead of
competitive access providers, most CLECs sought urban businesses as initial subscribers.
[T]he concentration of customers in urban areas reduces the cost of service
because it shortens the average length of the telephone line that connects a
customer's premises to a telephone company's primary facilities .... [B]usiness
users can generate more revenue and be less costly to serve because businesses
are more likely than residential customers to buy a greater volume and variety of
telecommunications services. The greater profitability of serving urban business
markets is also related to the prices-set by regulators-that incumbent carriers
charge for telephone service.
Id. Obviously, the business tariff set higher than actual cost makes this the most inviting
target for new entrants. "It is an industry rule of thumb that local exchange carriers obtain
80 percent of their total revenues from 20 percent of their customers." WILLIAM J. BAUMOL
& J. GREGORY SIDAK, TOwARD COMPETITION IN LOCAL TELEPHONY 11 (1994).
169. "The main argument in favor of bill-and-keep is that it can save on transaction costs
for interconnection. That may be the wrong approach, however, if traffic turns out to be
highly asymmetrical and substantial resource costs are incurred for handling the
interconnected traffic." VOGELSANG & MITCHELL, supra note 167, at 202-03. These authors
also note that interconnection agreements may impose substantial costs on networks already
at capacity, which suggests that costs may vary depending upon the peak-load volumes.
Under those circumstances, reciprocal compensation agreements should reflect the increased
network costs of adding capacity to accommodate traffic at peak-load periods.
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(although, to be fair, few people could). Had they foreseen this popularity,
the issue of transporting ISP-bound traffic might have. been negotiated
differently. 170 When former President Clinton took office in January 1993,
only a trivial number of pages existed on the World Wide Web. In 1994,
three million people had access to the Internet. By comparison, in 2000, an
estimated 300 million people throughout the world had access to the
Internet's one billion Web pages, with an estimated three million new
pages added each day.1
In 1994, 24.1% of American households had computers (in contrast to
93.8% with telephones), and the U.S. Census Bureau's current population
survey did not even ask about Internet use at home. In 1997, 38.6% had a
home computer, 93.8% had a telephone, and 18.6% had Internet access at
home. Just three years later, 51% had a home computer, 94.6% had a
telephone, and 41.5% had Internet access at home."2 The more than
twofold increase in households with computers in six years is significant,
as is the more than twenty-three-percentage-point increase in households
gaining Internet access in just three years. The accelerated rate of
technological diffusion at the close of the twentieth century in America
rivals its few precedents (radio in the 1920s and TV in the 1950s): from
1994 to 2000, the percentage of households with a computer more than
doubled, and during the last three years, households with Internet access
increased by more than one hundred percent.
Of the estimated 171 million Internet users throughout the world in
1999, more than half lived in the United States and Canada.173 In that year,
"[a]n estimated 39 percent of American adults had access to the Internet at
home or at work."' 74 Traffic on the Internet doubled every one hundred
170. A different pricing rule for ISP-bound traffic would not have affected the nature of
this traffic or the jurisdictional question.
171. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, DIGrrAL ECONOMY 2000 (2000) [hereinafter DIGITAL
ECONOMY 2000] (preface of William M. Daley, Secretary of Commerce), available at
http:/www.esa.doc.gov/de2k.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2001). See also The Web: Growing
by 2 Million Pages a Day, THE INDuSTRY STANDARD, March 6, 2000, at 174 [hereinafter
The Web: Growing by 2 Million Pages a Day].
172. TRENDS, supra note 19, chart 17.1 (citing data from the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration ("NTIA") and U.S. Census Bureau,
Current Population Surveys).
173. NUA Intemet Surveys, in DIGITAL ECoNoMY 2000, supra note 171, at 7. Note this
source estimates that 136.9 million people in Canada and the United States had access to the
Internet in March 2000.
174. THOMAS W. BONNETr, COMPETING IN THE NEW ECONOMY: GOvERNANCE
STRATEGIES FORTHE DIGrrAL AGE 52 (2000), available at http://www.xlibris.com/
CompetingintheNewEconomy.htmil (last visited Jan. 23, 2001) [hereinafter COMPETIM IN
Tm NEw ECONOMY].
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days during 1995-96, and has doubled each year since then.175 As of May
2000, "4.5 percent of the more than 50 million total ISP customers in the
U.S. [] have cable or [digital subscriber line ("DSL")] connections," which
leaves more than 95% using dial-up services through the local telephone
exchanges. 176
With the explosive popularity of the Internet, hundreds of millions of
dollars of disputed revenues for reciprocal compensation in well-kept
escrow accounts, rulings by more than half of the state commissions that
ISP-bound traffic was local by jurisdiction, and appeals pending in
numerous courts, the FCC issued a Declaratory Ruling on this matter on
February 25, 1999.177 The ruling concluded "that ISP-bound traffic is
jurisdictionally mixed and appears to be largely interstate .... In the
absence, to date, of a federal rule regarding the appropriate inter-carrier
compensation for this traffic, we therefore conclude that parties should be
bound by their existing interconnection agreements, as interpreted by state
commissions.' 78
The 1996 Act grants the FCC jurisdiction over "all interstate and
foreign communication by wire.",79 Traffic is interstate "when the
communication or transmission originates in any state, territory, possession
of the United States, or the District of Columbia and terminates in another
state, territory, possession, or the District of Columbia.'"'8 The 1996 Act
defines telecommunications as "the transmission, between or among points
specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing, without change
in the form or content of the information as sent and received.''. ISP-
bound traffic is interstate because "communications should be analyzed on
an end-to-end basis,"' 82 and "a substantial portion of Internet traffic
involves accessing interstate or foreign websites.' ' 3
175. ANDREW ODLYZKO, AT&T LABS-RESEARCH, INTERNET GROWTH: MYTH AND
REALITY, USE AND ABUSE 2 (2000), available at http://www.research.att.com/-amo/doc/
intemet.growth.myth.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2001).
176. The Web: Growing by 2 Million Pages a Day, supra note 171, at 194.
177. Declaratory Ruling, supra note 1, para. 18.
178. Id. para. 1.
179. Id. para. 18; see 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (Supp. IV 1998).
180. Declaratory Ruling, supra note 1, para. 18; see Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal
Serv., Report to Congress, 13 F.C.C.R. 11,501, par. 112, 11 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1312
(1998).
181. 47 U.S.C. § 153(43).
182. Declaratory Ruling, supra note 1, para. 15; "[B]oth court and Commission
decisions have considered the end-to-end nature of the communications more significant
than the facilities used to complete such communications." Teleconnect Co. v. Bell Tel. Co.
of Pa., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 10 F.C.C.R. 1626, para. 12 (1995), affid sub nom.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 116 F.3d 593 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
183. Declaratory Ruling, supra note 1, para. 18.
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The FCC ruling rejected the various semantic arguments made by the
CLECs that really two calls were being made-the first one locally to the
ISP, which was terminated, and the second one into cyberspace via the
Internet, which is not truly telecommunications. The services provided by
ISPs are included in "enhanced services," which are provided "over
common carrier transmission facilities used in interstate
communications."' Internet access falls within the family of "information
services," defined by the 1996 Act as "the offering of a capability for
generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving,
utilizing, or making available information via telecommunications."' 5
Hence, these calls do not terminate at the ISP; they are not exclusively
local calls subject to reciprocal compensation.18 6
Curiously, however, this Declaratory Ruling did not cite as precedent
the tariffing requirement for incumbent telephone companies offering DSL
services, which the FCC established in 1998.8 7 According to an FCC White
Paper, "DSL is a high speed telecommunications service that offers
consumers the ability to access data services at speeds of up to 50 times the
traditional 56 kbps dial-up modem. The Commission concluded that DSL
services were properly classified as interstate telecommunications services
and should be tariffed at the federal level. 188 Obviously, a call to
cyberspace, either through a DSL connection or via an ISP, constitutes an
interstate call under the FCC's jurisdiction.
Having established its authority to rule on this matter, the FCC
concluded that the "parties should be bound by their existing
interconnection agreements, as interpreted by state commissions."' 89 This
pushed the dispute, in the interim, back to the state commissions, although
the FCC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the matter.90 The
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking reflected the former Chairman's
conciliatory approach of trying to work with the state commissions instead
of battling them over jurisdiction, as previous Chairmen did.'9' It may have
184. Id. para. 13 (quoting 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a) (1999)).
185. Id. para. 13 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 153(20)).
186. kd paras. 14-15.
187. GTE Tel. Operating Cos., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 22,466,
14 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 279 (1998).
188. OXMAN, supra note 65, at 19.
189. Declaratory Ruling, supra note 1, para. 18.
190. OXMAN, supra note 65, at 19.
191. The Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs, Resolution Regarding the "Magna
Carta" for State, U.S. Territories, and Federal Regulators, available at
http://www.naruc.orgfResolutions/rescont.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2001). Former Chairman
William Kennard first proposed this Magna Carta between the FCC and NARUC. See
Rowe, supra note 77, at 891.
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also reflected the FCC's respect for the substantial work done by the state
commissions in negotiating and arbitrating this first round of
interconnection agreements. These interpretations notwithstanding, this
anomalous approach stands out in the contentious history of dual regulation
of telecommunications in this country. 92 It did not deter the disputing
parties from seeking relief from the Declaratory Ruling in court.'93
Following the Declaratory Ruling, industry analysts lowered their
192. The D.C. Circuit also raised an eyebrow at this approach:
Having thus taken the calls to ISPs out of § 251(b)(5)'s provision for
"reciprocal compensation" (as it interpreted it), the Commission could
nonetheless itself have set rates for such calls, but it elected not to. In a Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, [] the Commission tentatively concluded that "a
negotiation process, driven by market forces, is more likely to lead to efficient
outcomes than are rates set by regulation," [] but for the nonce it left open the
matter of implementing a system of federal controls. It observed that in the
meantime parties may voluntarily include reciprocal compensation provisions in
their interconnection agreements, and that state commissions, which have
authority to arbitrate disputes over such agreements, can construe the
agreements as requiring such compensation; indeed, even when the agreements
of interconnecting LECs include no linguistic hook for such a requirement, the
commissions can find that reciprocal compensation is appropriate.
Bell AU. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 206 F.3d 1, 2-3 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). Others
might note the inconsistency of the FCC's staunch opposition to the efforts by the
International Telecommunication Union ("ITU") to regulate the manner and rates at which
Internet traffic is exchanged, and its decision to let the fifty-one state PUCs resolve this
dispute. See Abelson Lays Out U.S. Opposition to ITU Study Group Plan, COMM. DAILY,
Apr. 27, 2000, at 2.
193. Bell Atl. Tel. Co., 206 F.3d at 3.
This outcome left at least two unhappy groups. One, led by Bell Atlantic,
consists of incumbent LECs (the "incumbents"). Quite content with the
Commission's finding of § 251(b)(5)'s inapplicability, the incumbents objected
to its conclusion that in the absence of federal regulation state commissions
have the authority to impose reciprocal compensation. Although the
Commission's new rulemaking on the subject may eventuate in a rule that
preempts the states' authority, the incumbents object to being left at the mercy
of state commissions until that (hypothetical) time, arguing that the
commissions have mandated exorbitant compensation. In particular, the
incumbents, who are paid a flat monthly fee, have generally been forced to
provide compensation for internet calls on a per-minute basis. Given the average
length of such calls the cost can be substantial, and since ISPs do not make
outgoing calls, this compensation is hardly "reciprocal."
Another group, led by MCI WorldCom, consists of firms that are seeking to
compete with the incumbent LECs and which provide local exchange
telecommunications services to ISPs (the "competitors"). These firms, which
stand to receive reciprocal compensation on ISP-bound calls, petitioned for
review with the complaint that the Commission erred in finding that the calls
weren't covered by § 251(b)(5).
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revenue projections for many of the CLECs, 94 and many state commissions
began to re-evaluate the issue. One state, Massachusetts, ruled that ISP-
bound traffic was interstate by jurisdiction and ordered a rate adjustment
for such disputed reciprocal compensation claims.'lg  Subsequent
interconnection agreements tended to include much lower per-minute
charges for transport and termination fees.' 9' Furthermore, a growing
number of state commissions-including Texas, California, and Ohio-
commenced general hearings on the issue.
On March 24, 2000, the D.C. Circuit vacated the FCC's Declaratory
Ruling and remanded the case.197 The court concluded:
Because the Commission has not provided a satisfactory
explanation why LECs that terminate calls to ISPs are not
properly seen as "terminat[ing] local
telecommunications traffic," and why such traffic is
"exchange access" rather than "telephone exchange
service," we vacate the ruling and remand the case to the
Commission.... [l]n the interim our vacatur of the
Commission's ruling leaves the incumbents free to seek
relief from state-authorized compensation that they believe
to be wrongfully imposed. 198
194. "According to Focal's 10-Q report filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, reciprocal compensation payments represented 71% of the company's
revenues for the most recent quarter." Fed. Filings Bus. News, Bell Atlantic to Cut
Reciprocal Compensation Rates in NY, Dow Jones & Co., Inc. (Aug. 20, 1999), available at
http://nrstg2s.djnr.com.
195. Bruce Mohl, Lawmakers Want to Reverse Net Access Ruling, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept.
29, 1999, at C4.
In a 3-2 vote in May, the [Department of Telecommunications and Energy]
reversed an earlier decision and held that Bell Atlantic was not required to pay
millions of dollars in fees to competitors for completing Internet-bound calls
made by Bell Atlantic customers.... Bell Atlantic says the decision will save it
about $150 million a year, and used part of the savings to finance $38 million in
rebates and rate reductions this summer.
Id.
196. Dow Jones News Service, Bell Atlantic, PaeTec Commun Reach Internet
Agreement, Dow Jones & Co., Inc. (Nov. 1, 1999), available at http://nrstg2s.djnr.com.
Bell Atlantic Corp. (BEL) and Paetec Communications Inc. signed a three-year
Internet agreement to set up intercarrier compensation rates for local and
Internet traffic in 10 eastern states and Washington D.C... . The agreements,
retroactive to February 1999, reduced the rates one company pays the other to
three-tenths of a cent per calling minute in fiscal [year] 1999 and to just above
one-tenth of a cent after 2000. The rates previously ran as high as eight-tenths of
a cent per calling minute, Bell said.
Id.
197. Bell Atl. Tel. Co., 206 F.3d 1.
198. Id. at 9.
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The CLECs interpreted the remand as a victory, while the head of the
FCC's Common Carrier Bureau said the court "merely asked for a clearer
justification of its FCC's ruling." '99 On June 23, 2000, the FCC sought
public comments on issues relating to the remand of the FCC's reciprocal
compensation ruling.
Additionally, the D.C. Circuit sharply noted the contradiction
between the protective armor the FCC gives to enhanced service providers
("ESPs") and the justification for ruling that ISP-bound traffic is interstate
by jurisdiction.20 ' ESPs link customers and computers via the telephone
network; they have been exempt from paying access fees to the LECs since
2021983. In defense of the ESP link exemption, the FCC continued to
maintain a distinction that lost its edge: Telecommunications services are
regulated common carrier services, while information services are not.
Hence, inter-exchange carriers ("IXCs") must pay access fees to LECs to
complete long-distance calls and provide universal service support, while
the ESPs are exempt from paying access fees and do not have to contribute
to the universal service funds.0 3
This policy distinction cannot be sustained.2 4 ESPs rely on the PSTN
in exactly the same way as do the long-distance carriers. Both should pay
access fees based on the cost to support the PSTN. Both impose capacity
199. Kathy Chen, Court Orders FCC to Reconsider Ruling That Internet Calls Are Long
Distance, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2000, at B8.
200. Comment Sought on Remand of the Commission's Reciprocal Compensation
Declaratory Ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, Public Notice, 15
F.C.C.R. 11,311 (2000).
201. "This classification of ESPs is something of an embarrassment to the Commission's
present ruling." Bell AtL Tel. Co., 206 F.3d at 8.
202. Neil Munro, Cautious Course on Internet Taxes, 21 NAT'LJ. 1620, 1621 (2000).
The biggest advantage for Internet firms came in 1983, when the Federal
Communications Commission voted to exempt digital transmissions from
telephone regulations that require telecommunications companies to pay access
charges whenever they link to the local phone companies' lines. The regulatory
break lets Internet users visit Web sites around the world at low cost. Its annual
value is roughly $7 billion.
Id.
203. Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Report to Congress, 13 F.C.C.R. 11,501, 11
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1312 (1998).
204. POLICIES ON PRICING AND UNIVERSAL SERVICE, supra note 16.
PSN traffic and advanced telecommunications infrastructure are evolving
symbiotically. In recognition of this, costs imposed on the PSN by those
accessing the Internet should be equitably shared among the originators,
conveyors and recipients of these communications in a manner that promotes
competitive markets, technological innovation, network reliability, service
quality, infrastructure investment, and universal service.
Id. at 38.
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requirements on the PSTN, so the access fees should be traffic-sensitive.
Consequently, both should directly contribute to the Universal Service
Fund ("USF'). The rationale that ESPs provide information services, not
telecommunications services, was an intellectual defense against making
direct contributions in the 1980s. 205 Such contributions could have been
defended prior to the 1996 Act, because most of the firms forming the
PSTN were protected from competition and guaranteed a reasonable rate of
return on their investments. Because the 1996 Act imposed competition in
the local exchange market, regulators may not impose burdens on the
•• 206
incumbents without providing appropriate compensation. The ESP
exemption places an unreasonable burden on the PSTN, a burden that
should be shared equally among all those who use this network.20 7 The
205. The weakest argument used to defend this ESP exemption from access fees came
from the former Chairman of the FCC. "While Mr. Hundt acknowledged that Internet
providers were getting low-cost access to the phone network, he preferred not to call it a
free lunch. 'The rate payers paid for this network,' he said, 'My argument is that it's been a
nice lunch for the entire country."' Mark Landler, The Bells Want F. C.C. to Make Providers
Share Internet Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1996, at D10. The second weakest argument
appeared in the FCC's Access Charge Reform Order. "[G]iven the evolution in ISP
technologies and markets since we first established access charges in the early 1980s, it is
not clear that ISPs use the public switched network in a manner analogous to IXCs." 12
F.C.C.R. 15,982, para. 345, 7 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1209 (1997). The third weakest
argument for maintaining the ESP exemption was that its purpose was to "preserve the
vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and interactive
computer services." Id. para. 344 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1998)). One
rationale for this artificial distinction between information services and telecommunications,
which is no longer valid, rests upon the concept of network effects. "Positive network
externalities arise when a good is more valuable to a user the more users adopt the same
good or compatible ones." JEAN TiROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 405
(1988). Curiously, this is also the public-benefit argument for universal service programs
and the underlying rationale for maintaining the quality and integrity of the PSTN. With
more than forty percent of American adults having access to the Internet at home, there is
little justification for subsidizing data transmission at the expense of the PSTN, because
both provide valuable social benefits from network effects. See TRENDS, supra note 19, at
chart 17.1.
206. BARBARA A. CHERRY & STEVEN S. WILDMAN, Unilateral and Bilateral Rules: A
Framework for Increasing Competition While Meeting Universal Service Goals in
Telecommunications, in MAKING UNIVERSAL SERVICE POLICY: ENHANCING THE PROCESS
THROUGH MULTIDISCIPLINARY EVALUATION 56 (Barbara A. Cherry et al. eds., 1999).
[E]xisting unilateral rules are fundamentally incompatible with a competitive
telecommunications industry because: (a) they are applied differently to
different firms; (b) firms have differential abilities and incentives to evade the
rules due to difficulties in monitoring compliance; and/or (c) the investments
required to satisfy the rules are sufficiently at risk to expropriation to preclude
voluntary provision of service at desired levels of quality, continuity, and price.
Id.
207. US WEST, Inc., Petition of US WEST Inc. for Expedited Declaratory Ruling
Affirming Carrier's Carrier Charges on 1P Telephony (filed Apr. 5, 1999).
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PSTN must not be forced to subsidize the data transmission technologies
that threaten to supplant the network. 208 Achieving regulatory parity by
treating all users of the PSTN equally is the most important policy step that
the FCC could take to guide telecommunications toward an equitable
209competition regime.
V. THE NATURE OF AN INTERNET CALL
State commissions have full agendas, and consequently, some have
resisted pleas from the disputing parties to schedule full hearings to
determine the nature of an Internet call. Having established such a fine
record in negotiating and arbitrating the first round of interconnection
agreements, the state commissions should initiate general hearings to
resolve this dispute. According to the FCC's Local Competition Order, the
state commissions' authority over interconnection agreements pursuant to
section 252 of the 1996 Act "extends to both interstate and intrastate
matters. ,2 ' ° As the FCC's Declaratory Ruling notes, "[T]he mere fact that
ISP-bound traffic is largely interstate does not necessarily remove it from
the section 251/252 negotiation and arbitration process.
211
Following this logic, the Colorado Public Utilities Commission
("CPUC") ruled on May 3, 2000, that ISP-bound traffic is not subject to
reciprocal compensation because "such calls are primarily interstate in
208. Most regulators and industry leaders are acutely sensitive to the ideal of regulatory
parity, despite the inability of regulatory agencies to achieve it. Other regulators might
identify with Steven Wright, a comedian who says, "I feel like I'm diagonally parked in a
parallel universe." E-mail correspondence to Author, Basic Truths from Comedian Steven
Wright, Apr. 18, 1998. The FCC's Universal Service Order included this reference to
aspirations of neutrality among technologies: "COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY-Universal
service support mechanisms and rules should be competitively neutral. In this context,
competitive neutrality means that universal service support mechanisms and rules neither
unfairly advantage nor disadvantage one provider over another, and neither unfairly favor
nor disfavor one technology over another." Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Report
and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 8776, para. 47, 7 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 109 (1997).
209. In responding to an FCC proposal that would impose access fees on Internet
providers that carried VoIP, Eli Noam noted:
"You want neutrality,".... "You don't want anyone getting a competitive
advantage or disadvantage based on the regulatory treatment of the technology
they are employing.
"The Internet industry would shrink in horror from the idea of industrial
policy. But that is exactly what they are advocating. They say they are young,
they are new, so treat us preferentially."
Seth Schiesel, F.C.C. Urges Policy Change in Cyberspace: Internet Phone Service Would
Be Fee-Based, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1998, at D4.
210. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499, para. 84, 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1
(1996).
211. Declaratory Ruling, supra note 1, para. 25.
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nature.'212 In addressing a full range of issues, the CPUC's ruling merits
careful review:
While ISP calls appear to be interstate in nature, our conclusion is not
necessarily based upon that [determination.] Even if this traffic were
considered to be local in nature, the Commission still would not
embrace reciprocal compensation with a positive rate. Such a scheme
would, in our view, bestow upon Sprint an unwarranted property right,
the exercise of which would result in decidedly one-sided
compensation. In addition, we find that reciprocal compensation would
introduce a series of unwanted distortions into the market. These
include: (1) cross-subsidization of CLECs, ISPs, and Interet users by
the ILEC's customers who do not use the Intemet; (2) excessive use of
the Internet; (3) excessive entry into the market by CLECs specializing
in ISP traffic mainly for the purpose of receiving compensation from
the ILECs; and (4) disincentives for CLECs to offer either residential
service or advanced services themselves. In short, we agree with U S
WEST that reciprocal compensation for ISP traffic would not improve
overall social welfare- it would simply promote the welfare of some at
the expense of others.
Three simple facts should form the basis for resolving this dispute at
the state level. First, "[t]hese interconnection deals were clearly formed
with voice traffic in mind., 214 Second, the underlying cause of this dispute
is that the Internet gained popularity far more rapidly than any reasonable
person could have foreseen. Third, the CLECs did not contribute to social
welfare by enticing ISPs to become their customers, and no data exists that
show that the ISP-users' monthly charges for Internet access were lower as
a result of these windfall revenues flowing from the ILECs to the CLECs.
Monthly fees for Internet access charged by most ISPs did not increase in
Massachusetts or Colorado after state commission rulings that Internet calls
were interstate and not subject to reciprocal compensation. In short, the
flow of revenues from ILECs to CLECs, when ISP calls are subject to
reciprocal compensation for termination, constitutes a transfer of wealth
212. Sprint Comms. Co., L.P., Col. Pub. Utils. Comm., Decision No. COO-479, Docket
No. OOB-01 1T, 2000 WL 689363, at *2 (May 5,2000).
Given that most Internet calls end at locations out of state, it appears that such
calls are primarily interstate in nature. We view the originator of the Internet-
bound call as acting primarily as a customer of the ISP, not as a customer of U S
WEST. Both U S WEST and Sprint are providing access-like functions to
transmit the call to the Internet, similar to what their role would be in providing
access to an IXC to transmit an interstate call. Furthermore, the remote hubs to
which Interet-bound traffic is directed are often outside the state in which the
call originated. Beyond that, the ultimate destination of these calls is some web
site, which is generally in another state or even another country.
Id.213. Id. (citation omitted).
214. FCC Decision Could Open Internet to Fed7l Regs, supra note 10.
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from the ILECs to the new competitors who enjoy a windfall.
None of the above arguments proved conclusive in the Texas Public
Utility Commission ("TPUC") ruling on reciprocal compensation issued
July 14, 2000.215 TPUC's arbitration award established permanent rates for
intercarrier compensation relating to the transport and termination of local
traffic between Southwestern Bell Telephone Company ("SWBT"') and
certain CLECs. According to SWBT's testimony, "average hold times are
approximately three minutes for voice calls as compared to 29 minutes for
Internet calls., 216 SWBT also alleged that ninety-two percent of the traffic
flowing to the CLECs went to ISPs.217 Consequently, SWBT argued that
ISP-bound traffic, using end-to-end analysis, was interstate jurisdictionally,
and, therefore, should not be subject to any reciprocal compensation
requirement because it is not local traffic. TPUC's ruling rejected SWBT's
argument, reaffirming its earlier decision that ISP-bound traffic was local.
TPUC adopted a bifurcated rate structure, accepting the contention that the
calls passed to the CLECs, on a per-minute basis, should receive less
compensation for termination than for setup.218
In reaching this conclusion, the Commission first examined the nature
of an ISP-bound call. It found that a call over the Internet consists of
two components: (1) the information service component, which is the
content of the call, and (2) the telecommunications service component,
which is the carrier-to-carrier and carrier-to-end-user transmission of
the call. With respect to the latter, the Commission concluded that
when a person calls an ISP within a local calling area, the traffic
carried on the call's transmission path is local in nature, with the
telecommunications service component of the call terminating at the
iSP.
2 19
TPUC accurately interpreted the Commission's meaning a decade
ago, before e-mail and the Web became killer applications of this digital
revolution. In the early 1990s, a handful of ISPs offered online services that
relied exclusively upon their proprietary information systems. It quickly
became apparent that e-mail was the most popular service provided by the
new ISPs. The instant popularity of e-mail demonstrates the powerful effect
of network externalities-as more people joined these networks, all users
215. Reciprocal Compensation, No. 21,982, 2000 Tex. PUC LEXIS 95 (Tex. Pub. Util.
Comm'n July 14, 2000).
216. Id. at *67.
217. Id. at *37.
218. Id. at *76. "IT]he two-part end-office rate, consisting of (1) a per call charge for the
compensation of setup costs ($0.0010887 per call) and (2) a per minute charge ($0.0010423
per minute) for the compensation of volume-sensitive costs, shall be applied to all local
traffic, including ISP-bound traffic." Id.
219. Id. at* 12-13.
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received more value from being linked to them. 22 The majority of people
use the Internet to send and receive e-mail.221 This medium has become so
popular that the daily volume of e-mail now dwarfs the volume of first-
222
class mail delivered each day by the United States Postal Service.
The most successful of the ISP pioneers, America Online ("AOL"),
grew rapidly because it valued and cultivated these communication
functions. AOL promoted "chat rooms," where users could engage others
who shared common interests. AOL was
the first company to heavily market its chat groups, the only one to
allow private rooms, and the first company to have unregulated message
boards. ... AOL also heavily promoted its policy of allowing accounts
with multiple screen names-helping families, but also allowing users
to instantly switch to code names like "hotlegs49" for trolling the chat
groups anonymously.
223
Its most popular service today is called Instant Messaging, which allows
224
users to communicate in real time with one or more other users. Hiding
behind the euphemism of information services should not obscure this
simple fact: Internet users are using this new medium to communicate with
each other in real time.2 5 Indeed, Net2Phone agreed with AOL and
220. TiROLE, supra note 205, at 405. "Positive network externalities arise when a good is
more valuable to a user the more users adopt the same good or compatible ones." Id.
221. See OwEN, supra note 62, at 9.
About 40 percent of United States homes are equipped with personal computers,
a number that appears to have stopped increasing rapidly. Average hours of
weekly Internet use among those who are connected, business and residential,
has increased from about three to about seven over the period 1995-1997. The
number of e-mail users and the volume of e-mail per user have increased rapidly
and are expected to skyrocket in the coming decade. E-mail undoubtedly is the
most popular use of the Internet, and for many it is their only use of the
Internet... .[Viewers can tailor their leisure consumption of information and
entertainment and advertisers can target their audiences with the same precision
as print media. The Internet user can choose among literally millions of sources
of information and amusement on the World Wide Web.
Id.
222. E.g., BRLL's CONTENT, Ticker, April 1999, at 128. The average number of e-mail
messages sent daily in the United States in 1998 was 2.1 billion; the number of pieces of
mail handled daily by the U.S. Postal Service, as of May 1998, was 630 million.
223. Nicholas Thompson, Sex in the Digital City, THE WASH. MONTHLY, July/Aug.
2000, at 31.
224. See Julia Angwin, AOL Makes Instant-Messaging Proposal, WALL ST. J., June 16,
2000, at A3. "Instant Messenger is by far America Online's most popular product, with 90
million registered users and 651 million instant messages traded each day. Instant messages
are different from e-mail because there is virtually no time lag between when one is sent and
when it is received, allowing for fast-paced chat sessions." Id.
225. Speech recognition software has become rather sophisticated. If two or more parties
use this software and link via Instant Messaging, then voice in real time replaces typing on
keyboards as the means of communicating online. See Michael Dertouzos, Internationalize
Number 2]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA W JOURNAL
Microsoft to provide free long-distance phone calls over the Web to the
instant-messaging users on their systems.226
The Internet was used prior to 1990 primarily as a research tool; it has
since become the most rapidly diffuse medium of communication in the
history of civilization.227 The protocol for the World Wide Web was
developed in 1989; the Mosaic browser followed in 1993; and Netscape's
Navigator browser, which was given away free to consumers, arrived in
1994.228 Internet users today can access approximately one billion Web
pages throughout the world that provide information on virtually any
topic. 229 They can conduct personal transactions, such as buying airline
tickets, bidding for specialized items in online auctions, ordering new cars,
finding real estate, making vacation plans, ordering dinner, arranging
entertainment plans, buying and selling securities, or obtaining documents
and files for research purposes.2' ° Most Web pages are not local.21' These
the Internetd, TECH. REv., July/Aug. 2000, at 24.
226. Rebecca Buckman, Microsoft Signs Net2Phone Pact For Free Calls, WALL ST. J.,
July 20, 2000, at B 14.
The new calling feature will be integrated into the newest version of Microsoft's
MSN Messenger service, which launches today. The service, like larger instant-
messaging services run by AOL, allows people to set up "buddy lists" of online
friends and chat with them onscreen in real time.
The new offering means that "18 million people can log on tomorrow
morning and get free long distance," Sarah Lefko, a Microsoft product manager,
said in an interview.
Id.
227. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE EMERGING DIGITAL ECONOMY 4 (1998),
available at http://www.ecommerce.gov/emerging.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2001).
The Internet's pace of adoption eclipses all other technologies that preceded it.
Radio was in existence 38 years before 50 million people turned in. TV took 13
years to reach that benchmark. Sixteen years after the first PC kit came out, 50
million people were using one. Once it was opened to the general public, the
Internet crossed that line in four years.
Id.
228. COMPETING IN THE NEW ECONOMY, supra note 174.
229. DIGITAL ECONOMY 2000, supra note 171, (preface of William M. Daley, Secretary
of Commerce). "Three hundred million people now use the Internet, compared to three
million in 1994. They can access more than one billion web pages, with an estimated three
million new pages added every day." l
230. See Thomas W. Bonnett, Taxing (and Not Taxing) Electronic Commerce, 17 ST.
TAXNOTEs, 1191, 1193 (1999).
231. Aharon Kellerman, Where Does it Happen? The Location of the Production and
Consumption of Web Information, 7 J. OF URB. TECH. 45.
It was observed in June 1997 that 40 of the most accessed 100 Web sites were
located in California, a finding which fits the geographical pattern of Internet
production.... In July 1999, the Web contained about 800 million pages, less
than one-half of which were accessible through major search engines.... [1]n
August 1999 the total number of unique visitors reached 63.1 million, an
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Web-based activities require communication and information exchange.
Based on the scope of these online activities, the FCC's ruling could
have expanded its justification that calls made by consumers to access the
Internet constitute communications, and, as such, qualify for interstate
jurisdiction. People use the Internet to obtain information (download music,
data files, software applications, etc.), to provide information, to complete a
broad range of economic transactions, and to interact in real time with
others. When an individual communicates over a distance, this action is
appropriately defined as telecommunications. Calls to access the Internet
do not terminate at the ISP, because the function of the call carried to the
Internet requires communication with another party (albeit in cyberspace).
The notion that ISPs only provide information services rests on the ancient
history of their proprietary systems. Rationalizing reciprocal compensation
paid by the ILECs may prove useful fiction for CLECs and regulators, but
it is no longer accurate, because Internet users are using the medium for
communications.
In resolving the devilish problem of reciprocal compensation for ISP-
bound traffic, state commissions may choose from among several paths.
They might follow Texas (which borrowed from the New York approach)
and limit compensation based on the length of calls being terminated by the
CLECs. Applying some formula with a low cost-per-minute, and perhaps
with a cap, is one pragmatic option, but this course cements the legal
fiction that ISPs provide only information services. Facts and daily
experience, to the contrary, clearly illustrate the communication functions
of the Internet. As long as CLECs maintain that ISP-bound traffic is local,
and thereby eligible for reciprocal compensation, they will resist the terms
offered by the ILECs. 2 2 The inevitable result of this stalemate would
further burden the state commissions. The failure of the state commissions
to promptly resolve this dispute would invite either the FCC to reissue its
increase of 11.5 percent over August 1998.
Id. at 55.
232. After reading an earlier draft of this Article, Edwin Parker, a telecommunications
consultant, offered this polemical call and response "Question: When is a contract not a
contract? Answer: When one party is an RBOC and it doesn't like the outcome." With all
due respect, these initial interconnection agreements were not voluntary contracts for two
important reasons: (1) the ILECs were mandated by the 1996 Act to participate in these
negotiations; and (2) most of the agreements were the product of mediation or arbitration.
To the basic point of this analogy, however, contract law provides ample precedent for
aggrieved parties to seek judicial relief when extraordinary events make the initial terms of a
contractual agreement untenable. In this context, the popularity of the Internet proved just
such an external, unforeseeable event. Lastly, because the ILECs had substantive reasons to
conclude that ISP-bound traffic was jurisdictionally interstate, they justifiably sought relief
from state and federal regulators.
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Declaratory Ruling or Congress to intervene. 33
State commissions could follow the leadership of Massachusetts and
Colorado in ruling that ISP-bound traffic is interstate by jurisdiction. Such
action preserves their jurisdiction over these interconnection matters,
facilitating subsequent rounds of interconnection agreements. This
approach also provides the rare virtue of restoring the integrity of the
language used in these discussions. Telecommunications is communications
over distance-a contemporary description of how hundreds of millions of
people use the Internet throughout the world. The term "information
services" should be restored to its original definition-information
provided within a proprietary system. To suggest, as a few apologists have
volunteered, that the ISP industry cannot unbundle these two services for
accounting purposes undermines its credibility.
Regulators face difficult choices when confronted with new
technologies and new services. The distinction drawn by the FCC in 1983
between information services and telecommunications was valid then.234
Today, however, the Internet provides communication functions, which are
growing so rapidly that public regulators should revisit this distinction to
achieve regulatory symmetry. The failure to act promptly may leave the
PSTN vulnerable as telephony continues to gravitate to wireless
235technologies and voice becomes packetized as data. Perhaps the PSTN
will evolve smoothly and effortlessly to accommodate the thrust into the
236digital future, but perhaps not.
233. See House Members Criticize CLECs for Reciprocal Compensation Scam,
TELECOM AM, June 23, 2000. "At a hearing on a bill (HR-4445) aimed at eliminating
reciprocal compensation for ISP-bound calls, Subcommittee Chair Billy Tauzin [] said
CLECs are guilty of 'highway robbery,' while others on the subcommittee accused them of
being 'scam' operators." It
234. Note the same definitions are key to the cable open/forced access issue: The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the FCC had the responsibility to establish a national
broadband policy for the country. AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 877-80
(9th Cir. 2000). The court determined that high-speed Internet access over the cable plant
was both a "telecommunications" service and an "information" service. Id Former
Chairman William E. Kennard announced on June 30, 2000, that he had "asked the FCC
staff to develop a framework for addressing these issues." FCC News, FCC Chairman to
Launch Proceeding on "Cable Access" (June 30, 2000), available at http:llwww.fcc.gov/
DailyReleases/DailyBusiness/2000/db0703/rrcbOO17.html.
235. Recall Licklider's cautionary warning: "People tend to overestimate what can be
done in one year and to underestimate what can be done in five or ten years." J.C.R.
LICKLIDER, LIBRARIES OF THE FUTURE 17 (1965).
236. See Clifford R. Holliday, We Have Found the Killer App-and it Is Killing Us, NEW
TELECOM Q., 4th Quarter 1997, available at http://www.tfi.com/pubs/ntq/articles/view/
97Q4_A7.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2001); see also POLICIES ON PRICING AND UNIVERSAL
SERVICE, supra note 16, at iv.
Although several avenues are open for evolution to networks that support data
[Vol. 53
ISP-BOUND TRAFFIC
ISP-bound traffic is interstate by jurisdiction because these calls
enable an individual to communicate over distances with other parties.
Although the FCC clearly has jurisdiction over this issue, it has pushed the
matter back onto the state commissions. Certainly, the state commissions
are capable and competent. They can resolve these disputes by themselves.
If, however, the state commissions do not resolve these disputes on
reciprocal compensation, injured parties will continue to seek relief from
the FCC and in Congress.237 The most important lesson from the history of
communications in this country is that companies will aggressively seek
the most appropriate forum in which to advance their strategic corporate
interests. Corporate advocacy shapes public opinion and often influences
public policy.238
VI. CONCLUSION: A NEW REGULATORY PARADIGM
Bargaining among various interests characterized the regulatory
approach during the regime of monopoly providers of telecommunications
services.2 The verb "bargaining" suggests that regulators had
better than the existing PSN, the current exemption of [ISPs] from access
charges inhibits that transition. The comparative price of compatible customer
premises equipment and local lines with packet switching capability versus
current analog modems and circuit switching is a disincentive for Internet users
to migrate to data-friendly technology. The exemption of ISPs from access
charges distorts prices and sends incorrect economic signals to end users and the
ISPs themselves. Until end user demands for bandwidth force ISPs to use what
are probably more expensive data networks, ISPs will continue to purchase
analog lines and use modems to change digital messages to analog and back to
digital packets for delivery over the packet network. So, to some unknown
extent, the exemption is helping to keep the Internet from growing into a mature
multimedia network.
Id.
237. Alert to potential encroachment on state jurisdiction, the NARUC Board of
Directors adopted a resolution on this issue on July 25, 2000, at its meeting in Los Angeles.
The resolution recommended 'that the FCC and Congress avoid imposing "one-size-fits-all"
solutions to issues concerning reciprocal compensation...' and opposes federal legislation
that prevents "states from tailoring the treatment of compensation for the completion of all
relevant calls to ensure an appropriate balance among the locally competing interests."
Barbara Combs, Reciprocal Compensation for ISP-bound Traffic-Summary of State
Activities, prepared for the Summer 2000 NARUC meeting (July 26, 2000) (copy on file
with the Federal Communications Law Journal.)
238. See TELEWARS, supra note 22.
239. See SWAK & SPULBER, supra note 132, at 112.
[Tihe regulatory process involves bargaining among the regulatory authority,
the regulated firm, its customers, and other interested market participants. The
bargaining process encompasses cost measurement, cost allocation, quality of
service, and allowed rate of return. Negotiation results in rates and investment
plans for the utility to provide service within its service area.
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unambiguous institutional imperatives and adequate information.240 The
constant balancing of competing social objectives241 might be a better way
to describe the telephone industry's history of regulation in the twentieth
century: improve the quality and reliability of telephone services; keep
residential rates low and protect consumers; expand services throughout the
nation; provide reasonable returns to stockholders to ensure adequate
telecommunications infrastructure investment; and thereby serve the
(undefined) public interest.
Each of these social objectives remains important to public regulators,
but the new federal policy mandate to allow competition to shape the
industry, guide investments, and develop new technologies adds to this
242
already full plate. The synergy of competitive investment and
technological advances is accelerating the pace of change in
telecommunications, yet the regulatory structure continues to drag along at
its interminable (and glacial) crawl.
State regulators hold an important responsibility to protect the poorly
defined public interest during this transition to competition in local
telephony. Specifically, state regulators must ensure that "service providers
do not shift network costs or reduce service quality in communities where
they maintain monopoly power to respond with cheaper prices and better
service to communities where they face competition. ' 24' Another important
challenge relates to nurturing advanced telecommunications in areas that
240. See Heather E. Campbell, The Politics of Requesting: Strategic Behavior and
Public Utility Regulation, 15 J. OF POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 395 (1996). Campbell
specifies a model that includes "stylized actors representing the firm, the regulator, the
intervener, and customers all acting under uncertainty about the future. There are also
important information asymmetries: The firm knows the most about its costs, the regulator
less, the interveners little, and customers essentially nothing." Id. at 399.
241. See Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through," 19 PuB. ADMIN.
REV. 78, 78-88 (1959).
242. "The challenge lays in finding an approach that allows markets to continue their
move toward increased competition, but which allows commissions or other entities to
continue their role of protecting the interests of citizens, ratepayers, and other constituents in
the future." Rowe, supra note 77, at 889; see also SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 132, at 16.
[W]e challenge the conventional wisdom that in network industries undergoing
deregulation the regulator must "promote" and then "protect" competition. Such
a policy is not truly deregulation, for it installs the regulator as a permanent
referee for competitive disputes.... Attempts to manage competition not only
entail administrative costs, but also can prevent the market from achieving the
benefits of competition that regulators seek to attain. Similarly, regulators need
not "protect" competition once they have allowed it to occur. Market incentives
are sufficient to allow competition to flourish.
Id.
243. William Gillis & Steve McLellan, Rural Telecommunications-From Market
Failure to Market Opportunity, NEw TELECOM Q., Feb. 1996, at 8, 12.
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lack effective demand for them, and resolving the distribution question of
paying for them. These issues reflect the paramount goal of ensuring
universal service, the dominant social ideal of telecommunications policy
in the twentieth century.2
Yet, the workload of the state commissions is shifting away from rate
hearings and toward becoming referees among competing providers. 245 In
this competitive era, two principles must guide regulators to establish a
level playing field as we hurtle into the digital future: First, government
may not impose regulatory burdens on any firm without adequately
compensating the firm, and, second, policymakers must work toward
neutrality among various technologies to enable markets to allocate
resources and services that enhance the public welfare in this competitive
era. Intercarrier compensation should reflect the actual costs of carrying
traffic originating on other networks. Maintaining the future quality and
integrity of the network of networks rests upon the ability of public
regulators to achieve this intermediate policy objective, and is essential in
advancing broad universal service goals.
244. POLICIES ON PRICING AND UNIVERSAL SERVICE, supra note 16, at 32:
[U]niversal service is only one of many public policy goals for
telecommunications industries, some of which conflict in real world
applications. Additional goals include: (1) development of competitive markets;
(2) deployment of advanced telecommunications infrastructure in all markets;
(3) encouragement of technological innovation; (4) use of deregulation, lesser
regulation and/or forbearance; and (5) affordable access for essential public
institutions.
245. "We believe that the role of the regulator will increasingly become one of a neutral
dispute mediator between parties unable to reach agreements through good faith
negotiations." Gillis & McLellan, supra note 243, at 15. See also DAVID W. WIRICK, NEw
MODELS OF REGULATORY COMMISSION PERFORMANCE: THE DIvERSITY IMPERATIVE (1990),
available at http://www.nrri.ohio-state.edu/suml999.htm#99-15 (last visited Jan. 27, 2001).
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